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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a consensus has emerged among practitioners,
policymakers, and tax scholars that financial contract innovation poses
significant challenges to the federal tax system.' These challenges are
widely thought to stem from our system of realization-based taxation.2
Under the realization system, tax on risk-based gains and losses gener-
ally is deferred until the taxpayer disposes of the asset generating the
gain or loss,3 and any gain realized often is taxed at favorable rates.4
By contrast, fixed returns typically are taxed when they economically
accrue and at ordinary rates.5
Commentators have identified two general ways in which financial
contract innovation threatens a realization-based income tax.6 First,
by facilitating the creation of assets taxed under the realization rule
that resemble assets taxed on an accrual basis, and vice-versa, it exac-
erbates what is referred to as "discontinuity" in the tax law.7 Discon-
I See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules and the Taxation of Capital Income, 50
Tax L. Rev. 643, 643 (1995) [hereinafter Risk-Based Rules] (noting "the widely recognized
crisis in the taxation of financial instruments"); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Commentary, Finan-
cial Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 460, 461 (1993) (arguing
that financial contract innovation has permitted taxpayers to exploit incoherence in the
dichotomy between fixed and contingent payments that underlies a realization-based tax
system); see also Notice 2001-44, 2001-2 C.B. 77, 78 (noting the particular importance in
the financial contract area of "consistent treatment of different instruments with similar
economic characteristics").
2 See, e.g., Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules, note 1, at 720; Warren, note 1, at 482. But see
generally Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism,
and the Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 861, 866-905 (1997) (noting but
questioning the severity of problems identified by commentators).
3 IRC § 1001. The definition of the term "disposition" is itself controversial and is taken
up in Sections III & IV.
4 IRC § 1(h). Exceptions to these basic principles are numerous, including, among
others, IRC § 1221(a)(1) (excluding inventory from the definition of a capital asset), IRC§ 475 (securities dealers' gain or losses from securities), IRC § 1256 (certain futures, for-
eign currency, and options). A number of these exceptions are discussed in more detail in
Sections III and IV.
5 See, e.g., IRC § 1272 (taxing accrued but unpaid interest resulting from original issue
discount).
6 See, e.g., Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules, note 1, at 643 n.1; David A. Weisbach, Tax Re-
sponses to Financial Contract Innovation, 50 Tax L. Rev. 491 (1995) [hereinafter Tax Re-
sponses]; see also Reed Shuldiner, A General Approach to the Taxation of Financial
Instruments, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 243, 249-50 (1992) [hereinafter General Approach] (describ-
ing the problems of realization taxation in related terms of deferral, selective loss realiza-
tions, and generic straddles).
7 The terminology is taken from Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Financial Products: A Concep-
tual Framework, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 569, 571 (1994).
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tinuity arises when economically similar returns are subject to
dissimilar tax treatments. Second, financial contract innovation pro-
motes what is referred to as "inconsistency" in the tax law. Inconsis-
tency arises when the tax treatment of a single economic return
depends solely on the form in which it is received.8 Here the problem
results from the dramatically enhanced capability that financial con-
tract innovation affords taxpayers to replicate economic returns sub-
ject to tax on an accrual basis with instruments taxed (in whole or
part) on a realization basis, and vice-versa.
Both inconsistency and discontinuity undermine the tax system in a
variety of ways. They provide electivity of tax treatment leading to
increased tax avoidance, they create uncertainty in the administration
of the tax law, and they generate substantial compliance and tax plan-
ning costs that are economically inefficient. 9 Further, they exacerbate
both actual and perceived inequities in the tax system, because instru-
ments that exploit inconsistencies or discontinuities often are availa-
ble only to well-advised, sophisticated taxpayers for whom transaction
costs are not prohibitive. 10 This problem is particularly acute in the
financial instruments area, where tax-motivated transactions tend to
be complex and generally must involve large investments in order to
be economical.1 ' The burden of covering the revenue shortfall that
these transactions create therefore falls disproportionately on less so-
phisticated taxpayers, who also may object to the inequity of provid-
ing tax benefits to those better able to pay tax.
These and related problems have led many commentators to call for
fundamental tax reform.12 Some have pushed for an accretion-based
tax system or approximation to it under which economic gains and
losses are reckoned annually without regard to disposition, 13 while
others have suggested that the idea of taxing income from capital is
8 See, e.g., Strnad, note 7, at 571-72.
9 See, e.g., Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules, note 1, at 651-56 (discussing costs of risk-based
rules with special reference to the impact of derivatives); see also David A. Weisbach, Line
Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 1627 (1999) [herein-
after Line Drawing] (identifying costs resulting from inefficient tax rules).
10 See Mary Louise Fellows, A Comprehensive Attack on Tax Deferral, 88 Mich. L.
Rev. 722, 727 (1990).
11 E.g., David M. Schizer, Sticks and Snakes: Derivatives and Curtailing Aggressive Tax
Planning, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1339, 1351 (2000) (noting the vertical equity problem created
by the disproportionate availability of tax planning to wealthy taxpayers).
12 Many of the criticisms discussed here form part of a more generalized and longstand-
ing critique of the realization rule. See, e.g., Fellows, note 10, at 723-28, Shaviro, Risk-
Based Rules, note 1, at 674-76.
13 See, e.g., Fellows, note 10, at 727-28 (proposing "time-adjusted realization event tax"
that closely approximates accrual taxation while preserving realization as a condition of tax
assessment); David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Tax-
ation, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1111, 1114 (1986) (proposing accrual system, with particular at-
tention to valuation and liquidity); cf. Shuldiner, General Approach, note 6, at 283-90
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flawed in conception and should be abandoned altogether. 14 Nearly
all assume that a realization-based tax system cannot effectively deal
with the opportunities to exploit inconsistency and discontinuity that
financial contract innovation affords, through the ever-more refined
allocation of economic risks and benefits that it makes possible.
Perhaps unfortunately, any comprehensive overhaul of the tax sys-
tem is unlikely to materialize in the foreseeable future, and indeed for
reasons that are well understood. There are at bottom two potential
alternatives for reform that would eliminate the problems created by
the realization rule. The first would be to scrap the income tax in
favor of a comprehensive consumption tax (possibly supplemented by
a wealth transfer or other tax). Such a move would largely eliminate
realization problems, because tax no longer would arise prior to a
clear realization event associated with the conversion of wealth into
consumption.15 Despite repeated efforts to popularize them,16 how-
ever, such proposals never have garnered widespread support, and
there does not appear to be any reason to believe that attitudes have
changed significantly in recent years. 17
The second course would be to move to what is commonly referred
to as a "pure" or "Haig-Simons"' 18 income tax, under which gains and
losses are comprehensively identified and taxed periodically, without
regard to realization. Such a mark-to-market regime already applies
(proposing bifurcation and expected value taxation for financial products that requires a
less ambitious reform of the tax system than do the preceding proposals).
14 See Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules, note 1, at 645 ("[T]he problems with relying on risk-
based rules raise serious questions about the entire enterprise of taxing income from
capital.").
15 Problems analogous to those that the realization rule creates for an income tax can
arise under a consumption tax, but these problems generally are recognized to be compara-
tively minor. For example, taxing consumption at the time of expenditure, or realization,
will result in overtaxation of consumer durables because actual consumption takes place
over more than one period. See Mitchell L. Engler & Michael S. Knoll, Fundamental Tax
Reform: Simplifying the Transition to a (Progressive) Consumption Tax, 56 SMU L. Rev.
53, 73-78 (2003). One way to address this problem (if it is thought to be significant) is to
pro-rate tax due based on a deemed consumption period. Id.
16 See, e.g., Laurence S. Seidman, The USA Tax: A Progressive Consumption Tax
(1997).
17 See Steven A. Bank, The Progressive Consumption Tax Revisited, 101 Mich. L. Rev.
2238 (2003) (reviewing Edward J. McCaffery, Fair Not Flat: How to Make the Tax System
Better and Simpler (2002)). In an effort to explain why consumption tax proposals are
unlikely to meet with success, Bank notes the problems that notoriously afflict proposals
for comprehensive consumption taxation. Nongraduated consumption taxes tend toward
politically unacceptable levels of regressivity, while graduated consumption taxes tend to
be viewed as overly complex.
18 See Robert M. Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in The
Federal Income Tax 1, 7, reprinted in Am. Econ. Ass'n, Readings in the Economics of
Taxation 54 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl Shoup eds., 1959); Henry C. Simons, Personal
Income Taxation 50 (1938).
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to a limited set of assets and persons, 19 but expansion of this approach
to all assets also seems to suffer from insuperable difficulties. A com-
prehensive non-realization-based income tax would require periodic
valuation of all capital assets, not just those that are publicly traded,
and it would require many illiquid taxpayers to sell assets in order to
pay tax. The costs and unpopularity of such measures likewise have
been recognized to make a Haig-Simons-type system a political
nonstarter.
20
In view of these realities, the question becomes whether any satis-
factory solutions to the problems of financial contract innovation are
available under the limitations imposed by the realization rule. Al-
though, as discussed above, many commentators have despaired of
such a solution, others have proposed a variety of more moderate re-
forms designed to enable the current system to deal more effectively
with financial instruments, 21 recognizing that a fully rationalized sys-
tem is not a realizable goal under current circumstances. This Article
is offered in that spirit. It represents an effort to identify a systematic
failing of the current system that could be corrected without sacrific-
ing the administrative and political advantages of a retained, though
modified, realization rule. In this respect it represents an effort at
partial reform, but a relatively global effort at that.
There are two aspects to the proposal. The first is to limit applica-
tion of the realization rule to a narrower class of returns than the class
to which it now applies. For most of its history the realization rule has
embodied an effort to apply wait-and-see taxation to the relatively
narrow class of risk-based returns that result from market-based fluc-
tuations in the prices of capital assets, not to all risk-based returns. I
refer to the risk associated with the receipt of returns from such mar-
ket-based fluctuations as "investment risk." A realization rule pre-
sumptively confined to returns from the assumption of investment risk
19 The principal examples are certain forward, futures, and other contracts under § 1256,
and securities held by dealers in securities under § 475.
20 See generally Zelinsky, note 2, at 879-94 (discussing both valuation and liquidity
problems that the realization rule avoids). It is possible that a kind of deferred realization
scheme could be adopted as a way to avoid certain problems of valuation. See e.g., Fel-
lows, note 10. Such a regime would permit tax on annual changes in value to be deferred
until disposition with an interest charge (or rebate) assessed to reflect forgone tax revenue
(or expenditures). This approach could resolve some liquidity and valuation issues but
would not be fully satisfactory. For example, tax due would accrue with the passage of
time, creating an incentive to defer disposition where assets had appreciated and then de-
clined in value. The political difficulties of charging interest on "unearned" gains and
losses would remain.
21 See, e.g., Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation of Equity Derivatives: A Partial Integration
Proposal, 50 Tax L. Rev. 571 (1995); David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax
Planning, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1312 (2001); David A. Weisbach, A Partial Mark-to-Market
Tax System, 53 Tax L. Rev. 95 (1999).
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could resolve many of the problems that financial instruments create,
without entailing wholesale reform of the income tax.22
The second, and more far-reaching, aspect of the reform would be
to apply such a narrowed realization rule to all investment-risk-based
gains and losses, whether or not they are received separately or as one
of several returns from a given instrument. This proposal would tax
on a current basis interest-like returns arising both from temporal di-
visions of property and from what I refer to as "risk-based" divisions
of property, or options, by means of a Black-Scholes-based theory of
option taxation. Current rules reach time-based returns in the case of
some property divisions but not others, and they generally do not tax
risk-based property divisions.
Two basic circumstances support the adoption of such a two-
pronged approach. First, most financial instruments that generate
risky returns are not capital assets of the sort historically accorded
realization treatment; they are assets that represent various kinds of
zero-sum wagers.23 Unlike changes in the value of traditional capital
assets such as stock or debt, the returns from such instruments are
unambiguously associated with equal and offsetting returns held by
identifiable transactional counterparties rather than with generalized
market effects. 24 These features of financial instruments make it pos-
sible to draw a hard, if somewhat formal, line between them and other
kinds of assets that generate risk-based returns.
Second, because tax-advantaged financial products tend to be suita-
ble only for high income, well-advised taxpayers, most of those who
would be unduly burdened by a more comprehensively applied Haig-
Simons-type regime would remain largely unaffected if these mea-
sures were confined to financial instruments. The proposal therefore
would avoid much of the hardship associated with a fully-imple-
mented Haig-Simons income tax.
Notwithstanding these virtues, it is important to acknowledge at the
outset that this approach, like any other that operates within the
framework of the realization rule, offers only a partial solution to the
problems of financial contract innovation, and it comes with its own
costs. As an example, arbitrage opportunities that involve offsetting
financial contracts on one hand and traditional capital assets on the
other would remain. The reason is that the line between investment
22 By "presumptively confined" I mean that returns from investment risk typically
would be subject to the realization rule and that other returns typically would not. As
explained below, the government nonetheless could reverse either of these outcomes
where circumstances warranted.
23 See, e.g., Peter H. Huang, A Normative Analysis of New Financially Engineered De-
rivatives, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 471, 503 (2000).
24 See id.
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risk and other kinds of risk is to some extent a formal one; ownership
of "hard" capital assets need not represent a different kind of eco-
nomic investment from that provided by wagering-type or other trans-
actions that are common financial products. Another result could be
over-investment in real, as opposed to financial, capital. Further
problems could include increased compliance costs because of the
more complicated accounting methods that would apply to some
transactions, 25 and the arbitrariness in taxation of certain nominal
debt and equity positions that arises from the fact that the line be-
tween debt and equity is somewhat formal. Although I believe that
on balance the benefits of the approach would outweigh its costs, I
acknowledge that the costs are real.
The next three Sections of this Article work out the reforms I pro-
pose. Section II sets out the basic concepts of realization and accrual
and describes the concept of investment risk. Section III describes the
phenomenon of carved-out interests in property, or "carve-outs," and
demonstrates how the tax system should deal with them in light of the
distinction between returns from investment risk and other kinds of
returns. Carve-outs are common features of many financial intstru-
ments. Section IV then applies this analysis to two common financial
instruments, showing that the investment risk criterion and the carve-
out analysis permit taxation of these instruments in a way that is rea-
sonably consistent with the policies that support realization-based tax-
ation and that provides a high degree of consistency and continuity
within the tax system.
Section V draws several conclusions from the approach that I de-
velop. Having explicated how a bifurcation regime that is based on
the investment-risk theory of realization might overcome problems of
financial contract innovation, I offer a number of observations about
discontinuity and inconsistency that have more general and more im-
mediate practical import. In particular, I show that the focus on in-
vestment risk helps to clarify why previous efforts at bifurcation in the
financial instruments area have been only modestly successful, and I
outline some of the properties that any successful bifurcation regime
should have. A brief conclusion follows.
II. THE INVESTMENT RISK STANDARD
A. Realization and Accrual Generally
As a general matter, ordinary income is taken into account in the
period during which the taxpayer's right to it becomes fixed and, in
25 See, e.g., Randall K.C. Kau, Carving Up Assets and Liabilities-Integration or Bifurca-
tion of Financial Products, 68 Taxes 1003, 1007-05 (1990).
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the case of cash method taxpayers, in the period when the funds are
made available to the taxpayer without restriction. 26 This rule applies,
with certain exceptions, to such items as fees for services, interest in-
come, cash dividends, and rents (to name several of the most impor-
tant examples), 27 and it reflects the basic principle that gross income
includes all accessions to wealth, whether or not the result of produc-
tive activity and whether or not reduced to cash payment. 28
The most important exception to this principle is the realization
rule, which defers recognition of gain or loss resulting from unpredict-
able changes in the value of certain assets until the taxpayer disposes
of the asset, even if the taxpayer can ascertain the amount of gain or
loss with certainty during his holding period and he has an un-
restricted right to cash out the gain (or to make good a loss).29 When
the asset has been held for more than a year, recognized gains also
may be subject to reduced rates.30 The typical example of gain or loss
subject to the realization rule is the increase or decline (other than the
decline due to statutorily permitted depreciation3l) in the value of a
capital asset. A taxpayer holding such an asset generally does not rec-
ognize gain or loss on the change in value of the asset unless and until
disposition occurs. 32
Although both the general rule of current inclusion and the excep-
tion for unrealized, unpredictable gains and losses from certain assets
are subject to numerous qualifications,33 these principles describe the
26 IRC § 451(a). Accrual basis taxpayers generally take income (and expenses) into ac-
count in the taxable year in which all events have occurred that fix the taxpayer's right to
and amount of payment (or obligation to pay expense and economic performance has oc-
curred), without regard to when payment actually or constructively is received (or made).
Reg. § 1.451-1(a); see also IRC § 461(h) (setting forth economic performance requirement
for accrual of expenses).
27 Exceptions include interest earned in respect of certain CDIs and certain payments
on NPCs. Reg. § 1.446-3 (accrual of certain payments under NPCs), § 1.1275-4 (accrual of
interest on CDIs). CDIs are discussed in detail in Section IV.B..
28 See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426 (1955) (holding that gross income
includes punitive damages received and stating more generally that it includes all acces-
sions to wealth).
29 The Code contains no express realization requirement. The closest statement appears
in IRC § 1001, which provides that gain is equal to amount realized less adjusted basis.
Instead the rule generally operates as a default subject to express override in certain in-
stances. See, e.g. IRC § 1256 (providing for mark-to-market taxation of certain financial
instruments); § 1259 (providing for realization on "constructive disposition" of certain "ap-
preciated financial instruments").
30 See IRC §§ 1(h), 1223.
31 IRC § 167.
32 If the property is held by an individual, gain or loss that accrues during the taxpayer's
life may never be taxed if the taxpayer holds the property until death. IRC § 1014.
33 Exceptions to the general rule include: Rev. Rul. 78-182, 1978-1 C.B. 265 (excluding
call option premiums until exercise or lapse of the option or the holder enters into a closing
transaction); IRC § 1272 (including OID prior to actual receipt of the interest payment).
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basic approach taken by the Code to most forms of income. What is
unclear is whether any rationale supports the general exception pro-
viding for nontaxation of unrealized gains and losses within the frame-
work of an income tax and, irrespective of any possible rationale,
whether the general exception can survive the challenge posed by new
financial instruments. The emerging view among tax scholars and
practitioners answers both of these questions in the negative.
34
In light of the persistence of realization as a criterion to taxing cer-
tain sorts of returns, this Article sidesteps the question of rationale
and focuses instead on the consequences of limiting realization treat-
ment to returns that result from the assumption of "investment risk."
The purpose of this limitation is not to demarcate a set of returns for
which realization treatment is somehow ultimately correct, but instead
to illustrate the substantial advantages that result from drawing the
line there, and from drawing it there consistently, given that the line
must be drawn somewhere. 35 This Section unpacks the concept of in-
vestment risk, a term I use to refer to investments generating returns
that historically have been subject to realization-based taxation, and
identifies some salient differences between returns that result from a
taxpayer's assumption of investment risk and other kinds of returns,
both risk-based and fixed.
B. The Concept of Investment Risk
As a descriptive matter, there are three essential features of price
fluctuations associated with an assumption of investment risk. These
features isolate the aspects of property ownership relevant to the risk-
based returns that historically have been subject to realization treat-
ment, as contrasted with predictable value changes and other kinds of
risk-based fluctuations, both of which historically have not.
First, the fluctuations must result from secondary market effects,
rather than from a change either to the property that generates the
return, or in the relationship of the holder to the property itself. This
criterion excludes from tax on a realization basis the actual receipt of
value, even though the receipt is not associated with a disposition, or
Exceptions to the realization rule for capital assets include IRC § 1256 (annual inclusion of
gain or loss for certain futures, foreign currency, and option contracts), §§ 354, 361 (non-
recognition of gain or loss by both shareholders and corporations in reorganizations).
34 See, e.g., Clarissa Potter, Mark-to-Market Taxation as the Way to Save the Income
Tax-A Former Administrator's View, 33 Val. U.L. Rev. 879, 882 (1999) ("Realization
cannot be generalized into a coherent principle of income."); see generally Fellows, note
10; Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules, note 1; Warren, note 1.
35 This Article does not address either the historical reasons for the limitation of the rule
to investment risk-based returns or the conceptual coherence of drawing the line in this
particular place (or any place, for that matter).
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separation, of property; it also excludes certain non-market-based
value shifts not associated with formal receipt. An example of the
former would be an increase in the value of property resulting from a
change to the property itself, such as improvements to it.36 An exam-
ple of the latter would be a value shift triggered by dispositions of the
underlying property by another that do not involve the taxpayer's for-
mal receipt, such as a constructive stock distribution under § 305(C). 3 7
In both cases Congress may tax the economic return as income.
Second, the change in value must result from market fluctuations
that are unpredictable ex ante. This criterion ensures that amounts
expected to accrue or dissipate at the time the taxpayer acquires the
asset can be taken into account as the accrual or dissipation occurs (or
is expected to occur). On the gain side the most salient example is
interest income resulting from OlD, and on the loss side it is deprecia-
tion. These amounts are predictable and, even though there may be
no disposition of or even change to the underlying property, are taxed
on an economic accrual basis.38
Finally, and most importantly for present purposes, the change in
value must not be associated with an equal and offsetting change in
the value of an asset or obligation held by one or more other parties.
This criterion distinguishes the assumption of investment risk from the
risk that is most common to financial instruments, in which the instru-
ment merely represents a set of offsetting rights and obligations of the
parties to it. In such a case, the net income of the parties is necessarily
zero, and the instrument itself merely specifies how the parties will
divide a fixed pot of predetermined size (apart from, in many cases, a
service fee paid to one of the parties). 39 Fluctuations in its value re-
present a shift in the parties' rights and obligations, not a change in
relative productivity of the asset apart from the income, or flow, that
the asset generates.
The paradigm case of an asset meeting the investment risk criteria is
a simple capital asset, such as a share of corporate stock.40 Fluctua-
36 An example is Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940), in which the Supreme Court
held that the lessor of real property was subject to tax at the termination of the lease on the
fair market value of improvements installed by the lessee. The government acknowledged,
and the Court assumed, that the improvements were not severable from the property. Id.
at 468-69. Congress provided for deferral of tax in the Bruun situation, but only where the
improvement is not intended as rent. IRC § 109.
37 Section 305(c) provides that in certain circumstances, no actual stock dividend to
shareholders whose interest is increased is required in order to trigger taxable gain to such
shareholders. See Reg. § 1.305-7(a).
38 See IRC § 163(e) (deduction for OlD deemed paid), §§ 1272-1275 (current inclusion
of OlD deemed accrued); see also § 167 (deduction for depreciation).
39 See, e.g., Reg. § 1.446-3.
40 See William D. Popkin, The Deep Structure of Capital Gains, 33 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
153, 196 (1983) (describing stock as "the modem paradigm of the capital asset").
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tions in the value of stock typically reflect changes in the market pro-
ductivity of the capital that ownership of the stock represents relative
to other capital assets. 41 For example, if the risk-free rate of return to
capital at the time the stock is purchased is 5%, then assuming ade-
quate market information, the stock should be priced to yield an "all-
in" expected return of 5%, plus an amount that reflects the added risk
the taxpayer assumes by investing in the stock rather than in T-bills,
which are viewed as risk-free.42 This all-in return would include, on
the positive side, income received by the company both from its own
activities and from its investments, and, on the negative side, current
expenses, depreciation, and loss from the company's investment activ-
ities. 43 In an efficient market the risk premium would reflect all pub-
licly available information regarding the risk profile of the issuer.
44 If
the stock turns out to produce returns in excess of the expected
amount, or if the prevailing rate of return to capital falls below 5%,
one would expect the price of the stock to increase so that its expected
return equaled the prevailing rate, as adjusted for risk. Conversely, if
either the stock's returns fall below the expected rate or the prevailing
return to capital increases, one would expect the stock price to fall.
This gain or loss typically would be realized on disposition of the
asset.
A similar analysis applies to fixed-rate debt, which, like stock, is
priced to reflect both the prevailing rate of return to capital and the
risk profile of the issuer. 45 Although an investment in debt does not
participate in unlimited upside potential or downside risk of the is-
suer, this risk profile likewise is impounded into the price of the debt
instrument:46 The greater the issuer's credit risk, the higher the inter-
est rate the issuer must pay on its debt. Moreover, like stock, the
value of an issuer's outstanding debt can be expected to fluctuate in
unpredictable ways depending on the relative productivity of the is-
suer's capital. Improvements in issuer creditworthiness or a general
41 The following discussion generally follows Marvin Chirelstein's discussion of the dis-
tinction between capital gains and ordinary income, though Chirelstein aims to explain
differential rates rather than the realization rule. Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fruit-Tree and the
Ordinary Income Base, 1 U. Bridgeport L. Rev. 1, 2-5 (1980).
42 For a discussion of the role of risk assumption in returns to investment, see, e.g.,
Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an Income Tax and a Con-
sumption Tax a Debate About Risk? Does It Matter?, 47 Tax L. Rev. 377, 392-403 (1992).
43 See Chirelstein, note 41, at 3.
44 See Robert H. Scarborough, Risk, Diversification and the Design of Loss Limitations
Under a Realization-Based Income Tax, 48 Tax L. Rev. 677, 688-90 (1993).
45 See id.
46 See id. Scarborough characterizes the risk premium on both stock and risky debt as a
"bet" element of the instrument. Id. at 683-84. As explained below, I prefer to reserve the
term "bet" or "wager" for transactions in which one party's gain or loss offsets precisely
the loss or gain of one or more counterparties.
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decline in the productivity of capital will reduce the issuer's cost of
capital, thereby increasing the value of its debt, while deterioration in
the issuer's creditworthiness or an increase in the general productivity
of capital will have the opposite effect.
Earlier I indicated that one type of risk that does not fall within the
definition of investment risk is wagering risk. This type of risk is prev-
alent in financial instruments.47 A typical example would be a no-
tional principal contract (NPC). In general an NPC is a bilateral
contract, or swap, pursuant to which one party agrees to make one or
more fixed payments in exchange for one or more floating payments
from the counterparty. 48 On the date the parties enter into the swap
arrangement the two rights typically will be of equal value, but over
time the values are likely to shift. In situations such as these, the in-
strument is more akin to a wagering transaction than to the ownership
of a productive capital asset. Each party in effect either bets that the
balance of rights and obligations will shift in her favor after the trans-
action is entered into, or makes certain assumptions about this
balance.49
Consider the following example:
Example 1:50 On Day 1, A and B enter into a contract pursu-
ant to which A promises to pay B $100 times the annual in-
crease in value, if any, of equity Index 1 for five years, and B
promises to pay A annually $100 times the increase in value,
if any, of equity Index 2 over the same period. On each pay-
ment date the parties net out their positions through a single
cash payment.
Under this NPC, each party assumes the risk that her position will
decline in value relative to the position of the counterparty. The par-
ties do not purchase an interest in productive tangible or intangible
47 See Kimberly D. Krawiec, More Than Just "New Financial Bingo": A Risk-Based
Approach to Understanding Derivatives, 23 J. Corp. L. 1, 5 (1997) ("[T]he derivatives
market is a zero-sum game ... ").
48 See Reg. § 1.446-3; Prop. Reg. § 1.446-3 (both setting out rules for taxation of NPCs).
As an example, at a time when the reference floating interest rate is 10%, one party may
agree to pay the other party $100,000 annually for a period of years in exchange for the
right to receive annually the reference floating rate times a $1 million principal amount
over the same term.
49 The purpose of entry into an NPC is not necessarily to engage in speculation. For
example, parties may enter into NPCs in order to hedge liabilities, as when the floating
rate to be received tracks a party's expected future liabilities. In that case they may antici-
pate that the balance of rights will favor the counterparty, but they are willing to assume
that risk in exchange for the insurance element the NPC provides.
50 In all examples in this Article, the parties are assumed to be unrelated calendar-year
taxpayers.
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property, and any increase or decrease in the net value of either
party's rights under the contract is offset exactly by a decline or an
increase in the net value of those of the counterparty. The total return
from this kind of arrangement, which in effect is a simple bet, is
zero.5 1 Indeed, the indexes used by A and B serve merely as markers
to determine obligations that are the risks of the parties to the con-
tract itself.52 Because neither A nor B has assumed an investment
risk, the case, if any, for extending realization treatment to their re-
turns hinges on such factors as administrability and limitation of arbi-
trage opportunities. 53
It is useful to contrast Example 1 with a similar transaction that
involves actual capital investment:
Example 2: On Day 1, C purchases $500 worth of Index 1
shares, and D purchases $500 of Index 2 shares. Also on
Day 1, C and D enter into a contract pursuant to which C
promises to deliver to D annually for five years one-fifth of
the shares of Index 1 that C purchased on Day 1, and D
promises to deliver to C annually for the same period one-
fifth of the shares of Index 2 that D purchased on Day 1. On
each payment date C and D deliver the shares pursuant to
the contract.
51 In fact what I have termed wagering risk comprises a number of risks, including the
risks that the loser will be unable to pay the winner (credit risk), that a contract is not
enforceable (legal risk), that opportunities to dispose of or hedge a position will not be
readily available (liquidity risk), and that human or electronic systems or controls will be
inadequate to manage ownership of financial instruments (operational risk). See Krawiec,
note 47, at 17-51 (identifying and describing these risks).
52 See Provost v. U.S., 269 U.S. 443, 455 (1926) (describing in lieu payments by borrower
to lender as a personal obligation, wholly contractual, that has been substituted for the
incidents of ownership). Proposed regulations under § 1058 carry through the Provost
principle; they treat payments in respect of certain securities lending transactions as made
pursuant to the lending contract and not on the security itself. Prop. Reg. § 1.1058-1(d);
see Edward D. Kleinbard, Risky and Riskless Positions in Securities, 71 Taxes 783, 784
(1993) [hereinafter Risky and Riskless] (noting that parties to derivative transactions gen-
erally assume the credit risk of counterparties to the transaction, not the credit risk of the
issuer of the underlying asset or security).
53 Edward Kleinbard notes that one distinguishing feature of derivative instruments is
that they are not finite. Any number of positions may be taken with respect to, for exam-
ple, a single share of stock, even though there may be only one owner of the share, because
the derivative instrument is really a contractual obligation of a party to the derivative
transaction; it is not an obligation of the issuer of the underlying security. Kleinbard, Risky
and Riskless, note 52, at 787, 795; see Kevin Dolan & Carolyn DuPuy, Equity Derivatives:
Principles and Practice, 15 Va. Tax Rev. 161, 164 (1995) ("The defining feature of deriva-
tives generally is that they are all executory contracts under which one party promises to
pay its counter party all or part of the economic equivalent of what the payee would derive
if the payee owned the underlying securities to which the contracts relate."). In terms of
the language developed in this Article, certain derivatives do not yield investment risk-
based returns.
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Unlike the contract in Example 1, the contract in Example 2 does not
necessarily reflect a zero-sum arrangement. 54 If, for instance, between
Day 1 and the first annual payment date, Index 1 appreciates by $5
and Index 2 by $7, each party experiences a gain. Similarly, both in-
dexes could decline in value during the period. In either case the net
result of the two positions need not offset because C and D in effect
have swapped their investments and it is merely their relative advan-
tages that will precisely offset: C is $2 better off than D under the
contract. This possibility of mutual appreciation (and of loss) reflects
the fact that the parties have assumed investment risk.
The foregoing considerations suggest that the line between invest-
ment risk-based returns and other kinds of risk-based returns may fur-
nish a clear and to some extent nonarbitrary basis for deciding when
to apply the realization rule. Whatever the merits of the realization
rule itself, the policy decision to draw the line at investment risk de-
marcates a subset of risk-based returns for realization taxation that
largely corresponds to the line between traditional risk-based returns
and risk-based returns provided by financial products. As to such
non-investment-risk-based returns, there never has been any contro-
versy over Congress' power to impose tax at the time of the economic
accession to wealth, whether or not associated with a realization
event. Unlike the cases of simple capital assets and debt, no long-
standing history of realization-based taxation, and no widely-assumed
reliance on such taxation, exists for wagering-type transactions.
Rather, the returns from most financial instruments, which typically
represent an assumption of wagering risk, are simply another kind of
return to risk that can be expected to be taxed on any basis consistent
with the holder's accession to wealth.
The purpose of these observations is not to defend the realization
rule as an original matter in the context of an income tax. Whether
the policies that support its application over other approaches-
within the framework of either an income tax or some other tax-is a
separate question. Rather, the purpose of this discussion is to uncover
the ways in which the realization rule actually has been considered
and applied under the income tax, and to highlight differences be-
tween returns traditionally subject to realization-based taxation and
other types of returns. This focus on the historical scope of the reali-
zation rule is largely pragmatic. By presumptively confining realiza-
tion treatment to market-based fluctuations in the value of standard
capital assets, the majority of assets historically subject to the rule
would remain so subject, while the majority of financial products asso-
54 This arrangement should be analyzed as the execution of five forward contracts. See
Section IV.A. for a discussion of the treatment of such contracts.
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ciated with increased discontinuity and inconsistency in the tax system
would be taken off of realization accounting. In other words, for ad-
ministrative, pragmatic, and political reasons, the historic line repre-
sents a suitable place at which to separate realization accounting from
accrual or other similar types of accounting.
III. CARVED-OUT INTERESTS IN PROPERTY
The preceding Section described the concept of investment risk and
offered a justification for limiting application of the realization rule to
income from the assumption of investment risk.55 This Section fo-
cuses on the consequences of such a limitation as applied to assets that
combine investment-risk returns and returns from other sources, a
common feature of many modern financial instruments. These other
types of returns typically consist of an interest or interest-like compo-
nent and, often, income from wagering-type transactions.
Such "mixed-return" financial instruments are a species of a more
general category of assets that represent nonspatial divisions of prop-
erty, sometimes referred to as carved-out property interests, or carve-
outs. 56 The tax treatment of carve-outs has been the subject of limited
scholarly attention, most of it seeking to apply realization and accrual
concepts in a consistent way to transactions in real or tangible per-
sonal property. 57 Not as much attention has been paid to intangible
carve-outs in general, or to financial instruments in particular. 58 Fur-
ther, the literature has not distinguished, for the most part, between
two general types of carve-outs that are relevant for present purposes:
those involving only temporal divisions, such as an ordinary forward
contract, and those also involving divisions of market risk, such as a
call option. Rather, the few commentators to have addressed carve-
outs have tended to analyze both of these kinds of divisions as tempo-
55 As explained in Section IV, there may be good reasons to extend the realization rule
to other contexts as well. The considerations that support such extensions, however, are
administrative and not grounded in the basic principle of according realization treatment
to capital gain and loss.
56 See, e.g., Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without Realization:
A "Revolutionary" Approach to Ownership, 47 Tax L. Rev. 725, 756 (1992) (discussing
carve-out of future income interest).
57 See, e.g., Chirelstein, note 41; Cunningham & Schenk, note 56; Kenneth F. Joyce &
Louis A. Del Cotto, The AB (ABC) and BA Transactions: An Economic and Tax Analysis
of Reserved and Carved Out Income Interests, 31 Tax L. Rev. 121 (1976); Jeffrey L. Kwall,
The Income Tax Consequences of Sales of Present Interests and Future Interests: Distin-
guishing Time From Space, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1 (1988); Popkin, note 40.
58 Cunningham and Schenk's article does apply the carve-out analysis to certain intangi-
ble interests such as options and other financial transactions. Cunningham & Schenk, note
56, at 775-92 (options) & 797-800 (investments). Their analysis, however, is not fully con-
sistent with realization-based taxation, as the title of their article suggests. See text accom-
panying notes 110-14 for a discussion of the Cunningham and Schenk approach.
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ral carve-outs. 59 The next Subsection reviews and builds on the basic
theory developed by these commentators for the taxation of temporal
carve-outs. The following Subsection distinguishes carve-outs involv-
ing divisions of risk from temporal carve-outs and argues that it is
necessary to adopt a different set of rules in order to tax risk-based
carve-outs. These rules are then developed and applied to simple op-
tion contracts.
A. Temporal Carve-Out Transactions
In a temporal carve-out transaction, one party transfers a time-slice
of the rights to underlying property and retains (or perhaps transfers
to one or more others) the remaining time-slices. Familiar examples
of temporal carve-out transactions include dispositions of remainder
interests, lease transactions, and sales with retained reversions. Trans-
actions that involve the disposition of a temporally limited property
interest are common features of modern financial transactions; they
include forward and futures contracts, many contingent-payment debt
instruments (CDIs), and many swap or swap-like transactions. For ex-
ample, a forward contract is a temporal carve-out transaction because
it provides for the disposition of property on a future date in exchange
for cash, typically payable on the same date as the property transfer
date. The effect of such a contract is the seller's retention of the inci-
dents of ownership, followed by their transfer to the buyer on the pay-
ment date. Many swaps and CDIs, in turn, closely resemble a series of
such forward contracts.
Prior to the advent of modern financial instruments, the principal
areas in which carve-outs figured were real estate leases and transac-
tions involving oil and gas properties. 60 A recurring example involved
the owner's conveyance of a remainder interest in oil- or mineral-
producing land in exchange for a (typically) contingent payment, with
the seller's reservation of rights to current income from the property
for some fixed period.61 The principal tax question such a transaction
raised was whether to respect its form, or instead to treat the seller as
disposing of the entire interest, with part of the payment made
through a purchase money mortgage extended to the purchaser. 62
59 See, e.g., Cunningham & Schenk, note 56, at 775-92 (discussing call and put options as
temporal carve-outs).
60 See Joyce & Del Cotto, note 57, at 131-34 (discussing carve-outs as applied to oil and
gas sales).
61 Id. at 121-30 (developing this example in detail).
62 The tax question arises because of the availability of a depletion deduction to the
owner of an "economic interest" in oil- or gas-producing property, but not to a party with
a lesser interest. See Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551, 558 (1933) (holding lessees were
entitled to depreciation deductions because they, and not lessor, had an economic interest
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Under the latter characterization, the transaction is a simple sale and
payments the seller formally receives from buyers of oil or minerals in
respect of the present interest are treated as made first to the pur-
chaser of the remainder interest and then as transferred to the seller
as repayments of principal and interest on the loan. If, however, the
form of the transaction is respected, the sale is a temporal carve-out
transaction: The seller in effect retains a present interest in the land
and disposes of a remainder. Under early case law, the latter ap-
proach prevailed in the mineral context, 63 but Congress has since pro-
vided for the former treatment. 64 Because, as argued below, the
carve-out rules more accurately reflect the economic substance of the
transaction, they generally should apply where taxpayers dispose of
such temporally limited interests in property.
65
1. Basic Economic Analysis of Temporal Carve-Out Transactions
To see why the carve-out analysis should apply to the transaction
just described, as well as to a wide array of similar transactions, con-
sider the more basic analysis of the economic value of a parcel of real
estate over time, where the fair market value of the property does not
fluctuate. 66
Example 3: On the first day of Year 1, A purchases Black-
acre, unimproved real property, at its fair market value of
$1,000. Blackacre is expected to and does generate rental in-
come of $100 annually for an indefinite period of time, paya-
ble on the last day of the year, and its value is expected to
and does remain constant for the foreseeable future.
in certain oil property). As a result, the seller of a fee interest in such property has an
incentive to characterize the transaction as a carve-out. One way to do this is to make the
price contingent on the productivity of the property. See Joyce & Del Cotto, note 57, at
131-34.
63 Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655 (1937) (holding purchaser of leaseholds not taxable
on amounts received by seller from oil production).
64 IRC § 636(b) (retention of income interest in oil-producing property treated as seller-
financed borrowing by purchaser); see IRC § 1235 (retention of limited royalty interest in
patent sale treated as sale of entirety of underlying property).
65 This statement presupposes that the economic substance of the transaction is a true
retention by the seller of the benefits and burdens of the property prior to its transfer. In
certain circumstances such a retention does not occur, and the form should not be
respected. In particular, where the seller of the future interest looks to the purchaser to
make good any deficits in expected oil or gas payments or otherwise does not bear the
economic risk with respect to the retained periods, the transaction is akin to a sale of the
fee financed with a purchase-money mortgage. See Joyce & Del Cotto, note 57, at 138-39.
66 The following discussion is based on Joyce and Del Cotto's analysis of the temporal
component of economic value. Id. at 123-30.
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The analysis of A's property interest appears to be straightforward. In
any given year A has $100 of realized and taxable income from the
property, apparently attributable entirely to the rental income the
property generates during that year. A has no capital gain or loss,
either accrued or realized, because Blackacre's fair market value has
not changed and, in any event, she does not dispose of the property.
As a number of commentators have pointed out, this analysis is not
correct as an economic matter.67 Although A annually has $100 of
receipts and $100 of real economic income, economically the annual
income is only partly attributable to the $100 of rent actually received.
Indeed, very little of A's economic income in any given year results
from the $100 of rent. Most of it results from the increase in the value
of the rights to rental income from Blackacre in future years, while
economic depreciation from disappearance of the present interest off-
sets the bulk of the $100 rent. To see this point, consider a slightly
different transaction:
Example 3A: On the first day of Year 1, B purchases a one-
year interest in Whiteacre, real property that is in all relevant
respects identical to Blackacre, from a third party for
$90.91.68 Whiteacre generates $100 of rental income during
the year, to be received on the last day of Year 1.
With respect to the income received in Year 1, A and B are in identi-
cal economic positions. Each has $100 of rent in respect of underlying
property that is neither appreciating nor depreciating. Offsetting B's
realized gain of $100, however, is an economic loss of $90.91 attributa-
ble to the wasting away of B's right to Whiteacre. B therefore realizes
net income from Whiteacre of $9.09. The deduction of B's (economi-
cally) unrecoverable cost prevents her from being overtaxed. Current
tax rules generally reflect this analysis.69 The purchaser of a term in-
terest, such as B's interest in Whiteacre, may deduct ratably the cost of
her interest against the income it produces, thereby producing a mea-
sure of her taxable income that more closely reflects her actual eco-
nomic income. 70
67 See Cunningham & Schenk note 56, at 760-61; Joyce & Del Cotto, note 57, at 123-30;
Kwall, note 57, at 7-20.
68 This is the value on the first day of Year 1 of the right to receive $100 on the last day
of Year 1, where the rate of interest is 10% compounded annually.
69 See Bell v. Harrison, 212 F.2d 253, 255 (7th Cir. 1954) (holding that purchased life
estates are amortizable over the expected life of the estate, and citing cases for the general
proposition that purchased term interests are amortizable ratably).
70 As explained more fully below, a more accurate depreciation rule would apply the
sinking fund method.
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It is hard to see why the same kind of analysis should not also apply
to A with respect to Year 1 in Example 3.71 To say that it should not
because A's interest represents a fee, and therefore is a nonwasting
asset, either is incorrect or begs the question. If one views A's income
from Blackacre as resulting solely from the rent received, then if A
sold the rights in Year 1 to a third party, one would expect the value of
A's reversion in Blackacre to continue to be $1,000. Clearly, however,
that is not the case. A's interest in Blackacre would be worth only the
present value of $1,000 to be received in one year, or about $909.
Thus, the definition of a fee, or nonwasting interest, must be able to
explain this change in value arising from the sale of term interests.
In fact the difference between A's and B's incomes in Year 1 lies in
the economic appreciation in the (essentially infinite) series of future
interests that A's fee ownership of Blackacre represents. For example,
on the first day of Year 1, A also owned the rights to the income ex-
pected to be generated by Blackacre during Year 2. On that day the
right was worth approximately $82.65.72 On the first day of Year 2,
the right to Year 2's $100 of rent had appreciated to $90.90. Thus,
during Year 1, A had net income of $9.10 from Year 1 and $8.27 from
the Year 2 right. Similarly, as the fee owner, A owned the rights to the
income expected to be generated in Years 3 forward, and the same
analysis applies to each of these years. The sum of these increases in
value is $100. Thus, ownership of the fee means simply that one owns
the expected future appreciation of the asset as well as the offsetting
depreciation arising from the disappearance of the present period's
receipt. Under the assumptions of constant value of the asset and
constant future returns from it, annual returns will exactly equal the
income from this appreciation, offset by the amortization of the loss of
the current year's receipt.
This economic accrual approach is not entirely foreign to the tax
law. Since 1982 a similar regime has applied to zero coupon bonds.
The OID on such bonds is taxed as it accrues economically on the
assumption of a constant interest rate during the term of the instru-
ment.73 The issuer and holder treat this accrued but unpaid interest as
though it had been paid and then reinvested with the issuer, so that
the holder has deemed interest accruals and the issuer deemed inter-
est deductions (subject to limitations that may apply to the deduction
71 See Cunningham & Schenk, note 56, at 760-761 (applying this analysis to a fee
interest).
72 This amount is the present value of the right to receive $100 in two years, assuming an
interest rate of 10% compounded annually.
73 See IRC § 1273(a)(3).
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of the interest74) on the principal amount and on any accrued interest
deemed reinvested. 75
The economic principles described for ownership of an ordinary fee
interest in real estate in Example 3 are similar to the OID rules. In
both cases income accrues to the holder of the right to future receipt
based on constant yield-to-maturity principles, and in both cases this
income accrues without regard to actual payment. The difference is
that the owner of a fee has offsetting amortization arising from the
disappearance of the present interest; this disappearance masks the
economic accrual. Where, however, the owner of a fee disposes of a
portion of the interest in a temporal carve-out transaction, the eco-
nomic effect of these accrual principles becomes more apparent. Ap-
plying OID-like principles to such transactions helps to explicate how
they should be analyzed for income tax purposes.
Perhaps the simplest example of such a carve-out transaction is the
sale of a future interest in real property. Consider the following trans-
action, similar to that in Example 3A:
Example 4: A is the fee owner of Blackacre, real property
with an adjusted basis in A's hands of $750 and a fair market
value of $1,000. On the first day of Year 1, A sells a future
interest in Blackacre to B for $826. The contract entitles B to
take possession of Blackacre on the first day of Year 3. Prior
to Day 3, A retains all rights to income from Blackacre,
which she holds as a capital asset. Blackacre is subject to a
lease for a term of years to a third party at an annual rent of
$100 and is expected to generate $100 of income annually for
the foreseeable future.
Under current law, A allocates basis in the interests sold and retained
according to their relative fair market values and recognizes a capital
gain in Year 1 of $206.61 on the portion sold. 76 In Year 3, A likely
recognizes a capital loss of $120.17, representing the difference be-
tween the basis assigned to the retained interest 77 and the zero value
74 See, e.g., IRC § 1630) (disallowing interest deduction to certain highly-leveraged cor-
porate issuers), § 163(1) (disallowing interest deductions to certain corporate issuers where
interest is payable in issuer's equity).
75 IRC § 1272 (holder's accrual), § 163(e) (issuer's deduction).
76 See Reg. § 1.61-6(a) (requiring equitable apportionment of basis among retained and
sold portions of property); Hunter v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 109, 115 (1965) (applying
regulation to the sale of a term interest). Since the fair market value of Blackacre is $1,000,
A allocates 82.64% of his basis in Blackacre, or $619.83, to the portion sold, which yields a
gain of $206.61.
77 Although the tax treatment of retained wasting assets in property is somewhat uncer-
tain, it appears that holders of such assets may not amortize their basis. See, e.g., Lomas
Santa Fe, Inc. v. Commissioner, 693 F.2d 71, 72-73 (9th Cir. 1982). As explained above,
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of that interest in Year 3. As a capital loss this amount generally is not
available to offset the $200 of ordinary income A received under the
lease. 78 B takes a basis of $826.45 in Blackacre in Year 1, which is
unaffected by the transfer of possession to B in Year 3. B recognizes
this built-in gain, if at all, on disposition of Blackacre in the future.
79
The foregoing example demonstrates the conceptual problems un-
derlying current law. While taxpayers allocate basis accurately, they
do not properly account for the effect of the passage of time on the
economics of the transaction. Although A's retained interest de-
creases in value by reason of the passage of time and B's enjoys a
concomitant increase, neither party treats these changes in value in
accordance with their economic substance-in this case, as akin to in-
terest earned or paid. The inconsistency may seem relatively benign
in this context, since one party's underinclusion is matched by the
counterparty's overinclusion, but tax symmetry is not necessarily to be
expected in carve-out transactions. Where, for instance, A and B are
in different tax brackets, or one of the parties is not subject to U.S.
tax, or the transaction is motivated by tax considerations such as A's
desire to shelter capital gain, the carve-out offers the opportunity for
tax arbitrage or other gamesmanship. These problems are especially
apt to arise in the financial products context, where taxpayers may
take advantage of the liquidity of markets in financial instruments to
exploit asymmetries.80
Application of the carve-out analysis to the preceding transaction
would rectify these distortions. The carve-out approach applies to the
taxation of a temporally limited interest, such as the retention of a
wasting asset, in much the same way as to B's income interest in Ex-
ample 3A, taking into account the accrual and loss that arise by virtue
of the passage of time. To see how this analysis would apply, it is
useful to examine bond-stripping transactions, the principal area in
which Congress has expressly provided tax rules that correspond to
the economics of a carve-out transaction. 81
this rule differs from the rule for purchasers of wasting assets, who typically can amortize
their basis, though the amortization is on a straight line rather than constant yield-to-ma-
turity basis. See, e.g., Early v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 166, 169-70 (5th Cir. 1971); CGF
Indus. v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 1405, 1415 (1999).
78 For purposes of the example, I assume that the offset is unavailable. For example, A
could be a corporation, unable to offset ordinary income with capital loss, IRC § 1211(a),
or A already could have applied the $3,000 of available loss to other income, IRC
§ 1211(b).
79 If B holds the property until death, the gain is never recognized. IRC § 1014.
80 See David F. Levy, Towards Equal Tax Treatment of Economically Equivalent Finan-
cial Instruments: Proposals for Taxing Prepaid Forward Contracts, Equity Swaps, and Cer-
tain Contingent Debt Instruments, 3 Fl. Tax Rev. 471, 485-90 (1997) [hereinafter Equal Tax
Treatment].
81 See IRC § 1286.
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2. Bond-Stripping Transactions
In a bond-stripping transaction, the owner of a bond disposes of
some combination of one or more rights to receive interest payments
on the bond-so-called coupons-and the underlying right to pay-
ment of bond principal on maturity-the strip. In the absence of spe-
cial rules governing such a transaction, the seller of coupons might not
be required to allocate basis to the coupons sold or retained because
they nominally represent interest, not principal; all basis would remain
in the strip. Such a rule offers opportunities for tax-motivated behav-
ior, if, for example, the seller could use expiring net operating losses
to shelter the income from a coupon sale and enjoy no gain or loss on
maturity of the strip. Similarly, the sale of a strip would permit recog-
nition of an immediate capital loss, since all basis would be allocated
to the strip, but the strip would have an economic value lower than its
face amount.8 2
In 1984 Congress enacted § 1286 in order to address these
problems.83 Section 1286 requires the transferor to allocate basis in
the bond to items disposed of in proportion to their relative fair mar-
ket values and to recognize ordinary income in an amount equal to
the sum of any accrued but unrecognized interest and market discount
on the entire bond immediately prior to the disposition.8 4 The trans-
feror's basis in the bond then is increased to reflect this inclusion and
also is allocated to the portions of the bond retained and disposed of
according to their relative fair market values. Any additional gain (or
loss) realized on the transferred portions is reported as capital gain (or
loss), assuming the bond is held by the transferor as a capital asset.
Where the stripping transaction is a sale, the transferee takes a basis
in the items purchased equal to the portion of the purchase price allo-
cable to each of them based on their relative fair market values and
treats each piece as an OID bond that accrues currently taxable inter-
est until maturity. Where the transferee's basis is determined with ref-
erence to the transferor's basis (as, for instance, in the case of a gift),
the transferee's basis generally is equal to the basis the transferor allo-
cated to the transferred portions immediately prior to the disposi-
82 See Joseph P. McGrath, Coupon Stripping Under Section 1286: Trees, Fruits, and
Felines, 38 Tax Law. 267, 268-74 (1985) (discussing problems in prior law that led to the
enactment of § 1286).
83 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 41(a), 98 Stat. 494, 531-43.
84 Accrued but unrecognized interest is taxed according to the OID rules. IRC
§ 1286(a). Market discount, which represents the difference between a debt instrument's
stated redemption price at maturity and the price at which it is purchased in the secondary
market (after accounting for any.OID), generally is allocated ratably, or on straight line
basis, to the periods between the purchase date and the maturity date, is treated as ordi-
nary and, absent an election to the contrary, is taken into income only on disposition or
retirement of the instrument. IRC §§ 1276-78.
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tion.85 As in a sale transaction, the transferee treats the acquired
bond items individually as OID bonds.
The transferor also is treated as having sold and repurchased the
retained portions of the bond for an amount equal to their basis, as
adjusted to reflect prior interest inclusions. The result of this deemed
sale and repurchase is to preserve any inherent gain (or loss) in the
retained portions until disposition or retirement of the bond but to
start the transferor's holding period anew. Each piece retained is
treated individually as an OID bond.
The reason this approach is correct is that prior to the stripping
transaction the bondholder is actually in the same economic position
as the owner of a fee interest in Blackacre.8 6 That is, economically the
payment of interest on an ordinary bond represents both a payment of
interest and a return of principal in respect of a self-contained asset,
just as the receipt of a rental payment in Example 3 economically rep-
resents both the receipt of rental income and return of capital. And as
in Example 3, this fact is masked because the other bond items, which
represent the rights to future payments on the instrument, also appre-
ciate during the interest period, in just the way that maturing rights to
future payments on Blackacre appreciated in Example 3. This appre-
ciation, which is the same as OID interest, is exactly equal to the
amount of returned principal in respect of the presently maturing cou-
pon, so that the total amount of interest earned in respect of the entire
bond during the coupon period is equal to the face amount of the
coupon.
3. Application of Bond-Stripping Analysis to Temporal Carve-Out
Transactions
Analogizing to § 1286, the proper treatment of the transaction de-
scribed in Example 4 becomes clearer. A's sale of the remainder in-
terest is akin to the sale of a bond strip.87 It is a present disposition of
a property interest, not an open transaction whose tax consequences
await the transfer of Blackacre. Treatment of the sale as a stripping
transaction property preserves realization treatment for the parties'
85 IRC § 1286(b)(4) flush language.
86 See Cunningham & Schenk, note 56, at 732. The § 1286 rules do not fully implement
the economics of the bond-stripping transaction because they rely on the OID rules to
compute interest deemed received by holders and purchasers. The OID rules do not ac-
count for the term structure of interest-the fact that at any given moment interest rates
on debt instruments depend in part on their time to maturity. See Joseph Bankman &
William A. Klein, Accurate Taxation of Long-Term Debt: Taking Into Account the Term
Structure of Interest, 44 Tax L. Rev. 335, 335-36 & passim (1989). Nonetheless, the § 1286
rules represent a vast improvement over prior law.
87 Popkin undertakes an analysis similar to that here. See Popkin, note 40, at 176-77.
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assumption of genuine investment risk while requiring current accrual
(or deduction) for changes in wealth resulting from the passage of
time. Under this approach A allocates basis in the sold and retained
portions of Blackacre in proportion to their relative fair market values
and in Year 1 computes gain on the portion sold. A's basis in the
transferred future interest is $619.83.88 A allocates all of the sale pro-
ceeds of $826 to the purchased future interest and recognizes gain of
$206.61. So far there is no difference from the treatment under ex-
isting law.8 9 During the period from Year 1 to Year 3, however, the
parties would take appropriate account of the effects of the passage of
time on their interests. A has retained a wasting property interest,
while B has purchased an appreciating one.
The treatment of B is relatively straightforward. She has purchased
an asset that will increase in value by reason of the passage of time, an
increase identical to the increase associated with ownership of an ordi-
nary capital asset, as described in Example 3. The difference is that B
has no offsetting current depreciation because A has retained the pre-
sent interest. As a result, B has income but no loss. This income ac-
crues on the same constant-yield-to-maturity basis that applies to OID
and that is tacitly assumed in the case of fee ownership of capital as-
set. On the facts of the example, the rate is 10%.90
The treatment of A is somewhat more complicated, owing to the
fact that her basis in the retained interest differs from its fair market
value. The retained interest is akin to a bank account with an initial
balance equal to A's basis, or $130.17,91 that produces income suffi-
cient to permit A to withdraw $100 annually for two years, leaving
zero after the final withdrawal. The implicit rate of return on A's ba-
sis is greater than the market rate of 10% because the property has
appreciated in A's hands.92 On the facts of the example, this implicit
88 $619.83 is 82.6% of A's total basis of $750.
89 It might be argued further that A has an additional obligation to deliver property
worth $1,000 in Year 3 that offsets her income from the retained interest. The amount of
this liability in Year 1 is $826.45. This liability is offset, however, by A's possession of
property that can satisfy the liability. This property is also worth $826.45 and appreciates
at the same rate as the offsetting liability, so that the obligation to deliver the property can
be disregarded. This issue arises in slightly different form in the case of an ordinary for-
ward contract, where the cash paid changes hands on the same day as the property. There
it is appropriate to take the liability into account because of the fungibility of cash. See
Section IV.A.
90 That is, if one applies a 10% rate compounded annually to the value of B's interest as
measured on the date of purchase, then on the day B takes possession under the contract
her interest will equal the fair market value of Blackacre as measured in Year 1, or $1,000.
91. A's basis is the fraction of the fee in Blackacre she retained, 17.36%, multiplied by her
$750 basis in Blackacre.
92 The fair market value of the retained interest in fact is derived from the market rate,
here 10%. Applying this rate to the right to receive $100 annually for two years yields a
present value of $173.55.
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rate is 34.1%. 93 In effect, A enjoys inframarginal returns on her in-
vestment, reflecting the tax law's assumption that capital does not
change in value during the taxpayer's holding period. The question is
how to treat the portion of A's annual return attributable to the differ-
ence between the fair market value of the retained interest, $173.55,
and A's $130.17 basis in it. Is it a capital gain that requires recognition
at some point during the carve-out term, or is it ordinary income that
should be treated as accruing during the same period?
At first blush, taxing this difference as capital gain may seem cor-
rect because the gain reflects the difference between the present value
of the interest and the amount A has paid for it. Certainly if A had
sold the present interest on the first day of Year 1 to a third party, this
amount would have been capital gain income. Under this analysis, the
$43.38 is imputed to A as additional capital gain income that supports
receipt of what otherwise would be infra-marginal returns. The prob-
lem with this approach is that A's retained interest is a wasting asset
that does not change hands, while capital gain generally is taxed pro-
spectively as a substitute for expected income from future periods. It
is not taxed retrospectively as appreciation that supported increased
returns (or increased expected future returns) during the seller's hold-
ing period.94 The $43.38 of built-in gain, however, is the gain that is
locked into the time-slices of Blackacre that A retains, not expected
value relating to periods beyond the term of the retained interest.
These observations indicate that the $43.38 should be taxed to A as
ordinary income rather than capital gain, because none of A's income
from Blackacre during Years 1 and 2 represents a payment for ex-
pected future income from the property. Though it may seem anoma-
lous to disregard the capital appreciation that is a correlative to A's
inframarginal returns, doing so is fully consistent with the treatment of
the holder of any appreciated property prior to disposition. Consider,
for example, two taxpayers, C and D, each of whom buys income-
producing real estate for $750 on Day 1 as a capital asset. Assume
that C's property immediately appreciates to $1,000 because it gener-
ates returns in excess of the amount anticipated on the purchase date,
93 That is, $130.17 earning 34.1% compounded annually permits A to withdraw $100 at
the end of Year 1 and $100 at the end of Year 2 with zero left.
94 Proposals for retrospective capital gains taxation date from at least 1939 but have
never been adopted in this country. See William Vickrey, Averaging Income for Tax Pur-
poses, 47 J. Pol. Econ. 379 (1939) (proposing retrospective capital gains tax). These pro-
posals generally would tax the holder's economic capital gains and losses that accrued
during the taxpayer's holding period at the time of disposition of the asset. Italy recently
has experimented with this regime, to mixed success. See Julian Alworth, Giampaolo
Arachi & Roni Hamaui, Adjusting Capital Income Taxation: Some Lessons From the Ital-
ian Experience (Univ. di Lecce Dep't of Economics Working Paper No. 23/10, Aug. 1,
2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstractid=407380.
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while D's property continues to return the expected amount and re-
mains at $750 for five years. On the first day of Year 6, D's property
appreciates to $1,000, while C's property maintains its $1,000 value at
all times during this period. If both C and D sell their property to
third parties for $1,000 on the first day of Year 6, the only difference
between their tax treatments is that C will have had substantially
greater ordinary income. On the sale date both C and D will have
$250 of capital gain. The excess return that C's property yielded dur-
ing the holding period is not subject to capital gains tax; rather the
capital gains tax that each owes reflects the expected future value of
their interests.
A's inframarginal returns in Example 4 are analogous to C's returns
in the example described above. The difference between A and C is
that prior to the sale of the property in Year 6 C has retained the
rights to all future periods, so that a sale of her property produces
capital gain, inasmuch as the value of the rights to these periods ex-
ceeds C's basis. A has sold to B all future periods other than Years 1
and 2, which she has elected to retain, just as C retains the returns
from her property in Years 1 through 5. In neither case do the excess
returns from the retained periods generate capital gains to the
holders.
4. Conclusion on Temporal Carve-Out Transactions
The principles described above could be worked out in much
greater detail for a variety of other, more complicated transactions, as
a number of commentators have done. 95 The object here, however, is
not to revisit this territory, but to give an account of the basic theory
of temporal carve-out transactions as a prelude to its application to
financial instruments, and in conjunction with the different set of rules
that, I argue, should apply to risk-based carve-outs. The thrust of the
carve-out theory is that because property rights consist economically
of spatial and temporal components, the tax treatment of income from
property needs to track these components. In the ordinary case,
where property remains temporally undivided, this temporal dimen-
sion is masked because accruals with respect to future periods pre-
cisely offset (or, under realization principles, are deemed precisely to
offset) current depreciation that arises as present interests become
valueless. The result is that actual receipts in respect of the property
equal the real economic income that the property generates, so that
95 See, e.g., Cunningham & Schenk, note 56, passim (applying this approach to a variety
of assets).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 57:
HeinOnline  -- 57 Tax L. Rev. 422 2003-2004
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
taxable and real economic income are the same and no tax distortion
arises.
Temporal divisions, however, undermine this equivalence because
they sever future appreciation from present depreciation. The owner
of a temporally limited property right therefore will have current de-
preciation in excess of appreciation in future rights (for the owner of
the present interest), or the reverse (for the owner of a future inter-
est). In the absence of rules that require tax accounting to follow
these economic consequences, distortions of both the timing and the
character of income result. This outcome is most evident in the basic
coupon-stripping transaction, where payments that economically re-
present a return of principal and interest nominally are either all prin-
cipal (in the case of the strip) or all interest (in the case of a coupon),
but it occurs in any transaction in which payment or the right to pay-
ment is fixed before the subject property changes hands. As indi-
cated, such transactions frequently are building blocks of modern
financial instruments. Application of the principles described in the
preceding discussion would remove these distortions and address
much of the discontinuity and inconsistency that arise under current
law.
B. Risk-Based Carve-Out Transactions: Taxation of Options
As suggested at the beginning of this Section, the universe of carve-
out transactions comprises not only temporal but also risk-based
carve-outs. Carve-out transactions that could be described as risk-
based involve the contingent disposition of benefits or burdens of
ownership and, I argue, are importantly different from temporal
carve-outs, though they are carve-outs nevertheless. 96
The building blocks of risk-based carve-out transactions are op-
tions. 97 Options involve the transfer of property based on the satisfac-
tion of a contingency. They take two basic forms: A call option, or
call, grants the owner of the option the right to purchase property at a
specified price (the strike price) at a specified time or times in the
96 The close connection between temporal carve-outs and risk-based carve-outs can be
seen from the fact that a temporal carve-out represents a special case of risk-based carve-
outs. It is simply an option with a strike price of zero. See Section V.
97 Other kinds of risk-based carve-outs are possible, but I do not treat them here. For
example, a contingent forward contract, pursuant to which the seller transfers property to
the buyer on the occurrence of an event or subject to a contingency (other than that of the
asset's attaining (or failing to attain) a certain price, in which case the transaction generally
is an ordinary option) is a contingent carve-out transaction. Contingent transactions of this
type raise questions of their own that are separate from the treatment of option contingen-
cies. See Matthew A. Stevens, The Tax Treatment of Contingent Options, 102 Tax Notes
525 (Jan. 26, 2004).
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future (the strike date); a put option grants the owner of the option
the right to sell property at a given strike price on the strike date.
Both call and put options may be exercisable on only one strike date
(European options), or at any time during one or more periods
(American options). An option is physically settled where property is
transferred pursuant to the exercise of the option; an option is cash
settled where the option holder receives the cash value (if any) of the
option on the strike date. For example, if on Day 1 S pays P $5 for a
cash-settled put option on one hundred shares of X Corp. stock with a
strike price of $100 on Day 2, then on Day 2 either the option will
lapse (where the value of X Corp. stock exceeds the strike price) or P
will pay S the difference between the strike price of the option and the
fair market value of the X Corp. stock on that date. No X Corp. stock
will change hands pursuant to the option (or even need be owned by
either S or P).98
1. Existing Approaches to Option Transactions
Agreement over the economic substance, and therefore the proper
tax treatment, of option transactions is lacking. The view long taken
by the tax law is that the sale of an option ordinarily does not re-
present a disposition of the property to which the option relates. 99
Rather the option sale is treated as an open transaction whose tax
treatment must await exercise, lapse, or other disposition of the op-
98 For ease of exposition, the following discussion assumes that options are European
options and, unless otherwise stated, are physically settled. In the case of options on stock
that does not pay dividends, the European option easily generalizes to the corresponding
American option the last exercise date of which is the exercise date of the European
option.
In general for such American options, there is no reason to exercise a call option prior to
the final date on which it may be exercised. See Shuldiner, General Approach, note 6, at
310-11. The same holds true for put options, except where the value of the property sub-
ject to the put is less than the interest income that the proceeds of exercise will yield. See
Richard A. Brealey & Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance 607 (7th ed.
2003).
99 See Rev. Rul. 78-182, 1978-1 C.B. 265. Exceptions to this rule include deep-in-the-
money options that have a strike price much lower than the underlying property's fair
market value and options with large premiums relative to the strike price that are credited
to the purchase price if the option is exercised. Because of the high likelihood of the
exercise in both cases, the sale of such options generally is treated as a disposition of the
underlying property. See Rev. Rul. 82-150, 1982-2 C.B. 110 (sale of call option for 70% of
fair market value of underlying stock with strike price equal to 30% of price of underlying
stock was sale of the stock); Rev. Rul. 85-87, 1985-1 C.B. 268 (sale of stock followed by sale
of "deep-in-the-money" put treated as constructive repurchase of stock sold for purposes
of wash sale rules of IRC § 1091); Reg. § 1.1361-1()(4)(iii)(A) (stating that a deep-in-the-
money option may be treated as a class of stock to which it relates for purposes of the one-
class-of-stock rule of subchapter S).
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tion (including cancellation). 100 Only at that time can the nature of
the income or loss associated with the option transaction be ascer-
tained and, therefore, properly taxed.
Example 5: On Day 1, A, the owner of 100 shares of ABC
stock having a fair market value of $100 and an adjusted ba-
sis in A's hands of $90, sells to B for $2 an option to purchase
the stock on Day 2, one year later, for $100. On Day 1, A
has held the ABC stock for more than one year as a capital
asset.
Under current law A does not recognize the $2 option premium on
Day 1 because it is not possible to ascertain the character of the $2 at
that time. If B exercises the option, the $2 is part of A's amount real-
ized on the sale of the stock and is long-term capital gain; if B does
not exercise the option, A has $2 of gain but not in connection with
the sale of a capital asset held more than one year. Accordingly, A
must wait until the option is exercised, lapses, or otherwise terminates
to determine her tax treatment. If B exercises the option, the pre-
mium is part of A's amount realized, and she has $12 of long-term
capital gain.10 1 If B does not exercise it, A has $2 of short-term capital
gain.102 B, the holder of the call, generally treats amounts paid for the
option as a nondeductible capital expenditure. If B exercises the op-
tion, she adds its cost to her basis in the property,10 3 and if the option
lapses or B sells the option, gain or loss with respect to the option has
the same character as the property to which it relates would have in
B's hands.10 4 Cancellation of the option generally has the same effect
as lapse. 105
Analogous treatment applies to a put option. If, in Example 5, A
instead had purchased a put option from B at the same price, A's and
B's treatments of the option premium would await exercise, lapse, or
termination of the option. If exercised, A would reduce the amount
realized by the option premium and B would reduce her basis in the
100 See Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931). Where the option purchaser transfers the
option to a third party prior to the exercise date, the transaction is closed with respect to
the transferor but remains open with respect to the option writer. See IRC § 1234; see IRC
§ 1234A (dealing with, among other transactions, option cancellations).
Note that open transaction treatment does not apply to certain publicly-traded options,
such as nonequity and dealer options. IRC § 1256(b). These options generally are subject
to mark-to-market treatment. IRC § 1256(a).
101 See Rev. Rul. 78-182, 1978-1 C.B. 265.
102 See IRC § 1234(b). Section 1234 is a specific statutory override to prevent taxpayers
from treating the gain as ordinary.
103 See Rev. Rul. 78-182, 1978-1 C.B. 265.
104 See IRC § 1234(a).
105 See IRC § 1234A.
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stock by the same amount. 106 If the option lapsed or were otherwise
terminated, A would have a long-term capital loss and B would have
short-term capital gain.107
A number of commentators have rejected the open transaction ap-
proach of current law as based on a flawed view of the underlying
economics of option transactions, or as inconsistent with established
tax rules regarding claim of right and constructive receipt. Calvin
Johnson has argued, for example, that option premiums should be
subject to tax on receipt and treated as ordinary income to the option
writer, because the option transaction does not represent, in his view,
a disposition of part of the underlying property but a separate transac-
tion generating ordinary income. 108 Bruce Kayle has argued that
whether one views the sale of a call option as a service provided by
the option writer or as the purchase of part of the property, estab-
lished tax rules do not appear to support deferral of tax for the option
premium. He also notes that an option can be likened to a partner-
ship, in which case returns generated by the underlying property may
be taxed to the call option holder or put option writer, rather than to
the owner of the property itself, if the partnership contract so pro-
vides. 10 9 Noel Cunningham and Deborah Schenk have argued that a
carve-out analysis akin to that applied to the forward contract de-
scribed in the preceding Subsection should apply to option transac-
tions, because the property owner parts with benefits or burdens of
the underlying property in connection with the execution of the op-
tion contract."10
Although each of these views reflects a justified unease with the
rule that a taxpayer's unrestricted right to the option premium some-
how should go untaxed until a future date, Cunningham and Schenk's
approach comes closest to what I argue is the proper treatment of
options. The strength of their approach is that it focuses on the
changes that the option transaction effects in the economic relation-
ships of the parties to the underlying property, and, as I argue below,
the most accurate economic analysis of options views them as a kind
of property disposition. Outside of the financial products area, enti-
tlement to benefits and bearing of burdens is, of course, the touch-
106 See Rev. Rul. 78-182, 1978-1 C.B. 265.
107 See IRC § 1234(a), (b).
108 Calvin H. Johnson, Taxing the Income From Writing Options, (Oct. 14, 1996), 96
TNT 201-54, at 68, Oct. 14, 1996, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File.
109 Bruce Kayle, Realization Without Taxation? The Not-So-Clear Reflection of In-
come From an Option to Acquire Property, 48 Tax L. Rev. 233, 261-62 (1993) (concluding
that treatment of option premiums under the open transaction doctrine is in tension with
treatment of similar payments outside of the option context), 270-75 (discussing the op-
tion-partnership example).
110 Cunningham & Schenk, note 56, at 775-84.
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stone of economic ownership for federal tax purposes,"' and
Cunningham and Schenk's motivating idea is that in economic terms
an option transaction is tantamount to a division of these indicia of
ownership. In substance, on their view, an option represents a present
sale of a future interest in the underlying property. The only relevant
difference from an ordinary prepaid forward contract is that the op-
tion is for a contingent part of the property.112 For example, a call
option is for the contingent appreciation above the option strike price
on the exercise date, rather than for all or a fixed portion of the prop-
erty on that date. But in both the ordinary temporal carve-out case
and the call option contract, the seller has parted with value that re-
lates to the property in exchange for present consideration. Thus,
under this approach, in Example 5, B would be viewed as purchasing
on Day 1 a contingent portion of the remainder in the ABC stock,
given by the ratio of the option price to the remainder value on Day 1,
which is $90.91. A would recognize $.20 of gain on the sale of the
option, and each party would accrue and recognize gain on the contin-
gent portion she owned during the pendency of the option, with a final
reckoning on exercise or lapse. In the case of exercise, A would have
gain and B would take a carryover basis; in the case of lapse, A would
simply leave her total basis at the accrued value on the lapse date and
B would have a capital loss.11
3
One difficulty with this analysis is that it is hard to see how it ap-
plies to a put option, because it is not intuitively clear how one can
view the purchase of the right to dispose of the property at a fixed
price as the transfer of a part of the property.
Example 5A: On Day 1, A, the owner of 100 shares of ABC
stock having a fair market value of $100 and an adjusted ba-
sis in A's hands of $90, buys from B for $2 an option to sell
111 See David S. Miller, Taxpayers' Ability to Avoid Tax Ownership: Current Law and
Future Prospects, 51 Tax Law. 279, 285-90 (1998). The benefits and burdens criterion as a
general matter has not carried over to derivative financial instruments, in part because of
the ease with which identical economic returns can be replicated without title ownership.
See Dolan & DuPuy, note 53, at 173 (noting that legal ownership and possession generally
suffice to determine tax ownership of publicly traded securities). Cf. Kleinbard, Risky and
Riskless, note 52, at 784 (noting that, in contrast to the basic benefits and burdens analysis
applicable in other areas, tax ownership of publicly traded securities is "necessarily...
formalistic"), 785 (noting that no definitive set of ownership criteria exists under the Code,
administrative authority, or court decisions).
112 A prepaid forward contract is a forward contract where the purchaser pays for the
property prior to its delivery date. See Section IV.A.
113 See Cunningham & Schenk, note 56, at 779-81. The authors also analyze option
transactions under a "separate transaction" theory according to which the option payment
consists of two transactions: a loan from the option holder to the writer that is paid off on
the exercise date, and a separate right to purchase, on the exercise date, the property at the
strike price. This right is paid for on the exercise date. Id. at 781-82.
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the stock to B on Day 2, one year hence, for $100. On Day 1,
A has held the ABC stock for more than one year as a capital
asset.
In Example 5A, the option relieves A of a potential liability. The
sense in which A has parted with a portion of the value of the ABC
stock, contingent or otherwise, is not immediately clear. Rather, it
appears she has in effect acquired an insurance policy with respect to
it; she has acquired downside protection. Although Cunningham and
Schenk apply a mirror image of the call option treatment to this op-
tion, the reasons for doing so are somewhat obscure. 114 The principal
justification of the carve-out analysis is that it is the appropriate way
to account for present sales of nonspatial interests in property. View-
ing the purchase of a put option as relief from a liability seems incon-
sistent with this approach, because the relief of a liability does not
appear to be equivalent to a transfer of property. Unlike a temporal
carve-out, no time-slice of property itself is transferred in a put option;
instead what is commonly viewed as an aspect of property owner-
ship-that one bears the risk of a decline in value-is transferred.
The foregoing suggests that the temporal carve-out approach should
not apply to call options either. At least two aspects of call options
support this conclusion. First, the temporal carve-out approach views
the call option transaction as the purchase of the contingent apprecia-
tion in the underlying property. In fact, exercise of the option, if it
occurs, will result in a transfer of all the property. The same will be
true of put options. Second, and more basically, property does not
seem to be reducible to "appreciation," contingent or otherwise, any
more than it is reducible to "risk of loss." Appreciation and risk of
loss are characteristics of property, not property itself. Viewing an
option sale as the sale of "property" consisting solely of appreciation
or liability is mistaken because it treats a feature of property-that it
can increase or decline in value-as itself property. 115
114 See Cunningham & Schenk, note 56, at 783 ("[Wlhat is carved out ... is a liability,
rather than a portion of the beneficial ownership."), 784 (stating that the writer of the put
option has an "interest" in the subject property, "albeit in the nature of a liability").
115 The purchase of a cash-settled call option from the property owner might seem to
represent a counter-example to the argument, since the purchaser acquires the right to
receive cash representing appreciation, not the property itself. But in that case the seller of
the property retains the rights to appreciation and depreciation, and payment under the
option contract represents merely a personal obligation of the option writer. The option
holder has not purchased the appreciation; she has merely purchased the right to its value,
while the seller has retained the property together with the appreciation. See Prop. Reg.§ 1.1058-1 (characterizing payments pursuant to a securities lending transaction as a per-
sonal obligation of the party to the transaction and not as made on the underlying secur-
ity). A similar analysis applies to a cash-settled call option where neither party owns the
underlying property.
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At the same time, the intuition that the execution of an option con-
tract represents the present disposition of a property interest is not
unfounded. What guides the intuition is the fact that in the case of
writing either a put or a call, the economic interests of the option
writer and the option holder in the underlying property change. In
particular, the option transaction effects a division of benefits and bur-
dens in the underlying property between the parties to the contract.
As stated, retention of benefits and burdens ordinarily is the touch-
stone of property ownership for tax purposes, and it is therefore rea-
sonable to view the execution of the option contract as some kind of a
carve-out transaction. In fact, an option represents a kind of transac-
tion that involves more than the disposition of a portion of the under-
lying property. It involves such a disposition, together with a separate
but related debt transaction. It is this separate debt transaction, and
its interaction with the underlying property transfer, that gives the op-
tion it "optionality"-its property as, fundamentally, a hedging trans-
action, as Cunningham and Schenk describe. Cunningham and
Schenk's analysis of the option as a property transaction therefore is
not so much incorrect as incomplete. The next Section discusses the
consequences of treating an option according to its complete nature as
a transaction combining a distinct property purchase and a loan.
2. Dynamic Hedging Approach to Option Transactions
The complete analysis of options as debt and equity transactions
was developed by modern finance theory. As contrasted with both
the open transaction treatment of current law and the analogical ap-
proaches advocated by Johnson, Kayle, and Schenk and Cunningham,
the transactional equivalents established by finance theory are exact,
if somewhat idealized. Further, these transactional equivalents have a
well-established tax treatment. If it is possible to analyze an option
contract in terms of equivalents about which there is no question re-
garding tax treatment, one may arrive at an approach for the taxation
of option contracts that at least is consistent with their underlying eco-
nomics. Whether the approach turns out to be consistent with the tax-
ation of similar instruments is a further question to be addressed in
connection with efforts to eliminate inconsistency and discontinuity in
the taxation of financial instruments, which I take up in Section IV.
a. Call Option
i. Simplified Case
Fischer Black and Myron Scholes provided the first approach to the
analysis of option contracts that accurately modeled options that are
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actually marketed to investors. 116 In an effort to derive a formula for
the pricing of call options, they demonstrated how the economic re-
turns from the purchase of a European call option on nondividend
paying stock could be precisely replicated by a process of continuous
hedging, or arbitrage. Arbitrage in this context consists in the estab-
lishment of an initial equivalence between the option on one hand,
and the purchase of a portion of the underlying property, together
with borrowing, on the other, and the subsequent maintenance of the
equivalence by constant adjustment of the ratio of deemed asset own-
ership and deemed borrowing during the life of the option as the de-
terminants of option value change. 117 That is, the actual change in
value of the option over time can be thought of in a precise way as
changes in amounts of the asset deemed purchased and amounts
deemed borrowed at each instant. Since the costs of publicly-traded
stock and of borrowing are readily ascertainable, Black and Scholes
offered a method that accurately prices call options on nondividend
paying stock in liquid markets. Subsequent refinements have devel-
oped models for more sophisticated options and for options on divi-
dend-paying stock.1 8
The starting point for this theory is the observation that it is possi-
ble to replicate a risk-free investment by purchasing an asset and
hedging it through the sale of some number of call options on the
asset, and by continuously adjusting the ratio of these two amounts
over the term of the instrument. 1 9 The ratio of the number of calls
sold to every unit of the underlying asset purchased is a function of
the determinants of option prices generally, the most significant of
which are volatility in the price of the subject property and the reduc-
tion of time to the strike date. 120 If an investor could continuously
buy and sell fractional amounts of both the asset and calls, and incur
no transaction costs in doing so, the price she paid for the asset and
the amount realized in any given iteration would always exactly suf-
116 Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81
J. Pol. Econ. 637 (1973).
117 The most significant limiting assumptions are that the market for the stock is liquid
and that there are no transaction costs. In addition, the model assumes, among other
things, that no dividends are paid on the stock. Id. at 640.
118 See Robert A. Haugen, Modern Investment Theory 469-70 (5th ed. 2001).
119 See id. at 461 (discussing Black-Scholes derivation from the binomial pricing model
described in the text here). Alternatively, one could sell the stock short and purchase
options. Id.
120 The other determinants are strike price, asset volatility, and the risk-free rate of re-
turn. Brealey & Myers, note 98, at 591-608. Black-Scholes treats these determinants as
invariant in order to simplify the analysis. Black & Scholes, note 116, at 640. Other option
pricing models take some or all of these factors into account to greater or lesser degrees,
and may apply to American options and/or to options that pay dividends. See Haugen,
note 118, at 470-71.
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fice to enable her to enter into the proper combination of asset owner-
ship and call sale to preserve the risk-free investment in the next
iteration. That is:
Z = Asset - X*Call,
where Z is the zero coupon bond replicated by the purchase of an
asset and the sale of some number of call options that perfectly hedges
ownership of the asset on the date the equivalence is established, and
X is that number. In order to preserve the equivalence with Z over
time, an investor would need to adjust both the amount of the asset
owned and the number of calls sold.
One can derive the formula for the call price by algebraic
manipulation:
Call = (Asset - Z)IX,
where the minus sign indicates borrowing. Like the original equiva-
lence, the option equivalence is maintained only on the assumption of
a continuous adjustment of the equivalent position. That is, the pat-
tern of deemed borrowing and deemed asset ownership must be ad-
justed continuously to continue to replicate the option.
The following example illustrates these relationships in the context
of a simplified option:' 2
1
Example 6: ABC stock, worth $30 on Day 1, will be worth
either $21 or $45 on Day 2, one year after Day 1. On Day 1,
B sells A an option to buy one share of ABC stock at $33,
exercisable only on Day 2. On Day 1, the risk-free interest
rate is 10%. At all times from Day 1 to Day 2, B is the re-
cord owner of the ABC stock, which pays no dividends.
On Day 2, the option will have a payoff of zero if the stock is worth
$21, and $12 if the stock is worth $45, in which case A will exercise the
option and hold one share of ABC stock. We would like to know the
price of the option on Day 1. As an initial step in determining the
price of the option on Day 1, one can reformulate the question of
option price in terms of the hedging model described above. If one
wanted to replicate a risk-free investment using ABC stock and call
options on it, one could do so by purchasing some amount of the stock
and selling some amount of the calls, such that after one year the net
value of the combined positions would be the same no matter what
happened to the stock price. Since such a portfolio would be risk-free,
its present value would be equal to the present value of a bond matur-
ing on the strike date and having the value of the portfolio on that
date.
121 This example is similar to that discussed in Brealey & Myers, note 98, at 592-94.
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The ratio of stock purchased and call options sold is given by the
ratio of the spreads in value they may have at year's end. 122 A share
of ABC stock has a possible spread of $24 ($45 - $21), while the option
has a possible spread of $12 (that is, $12 if the stock is worth $45 and
zero if the stock is worth $21). In order to ensure that the call sales
offset the stock investment, one therefore would have to sell two calls
for every share of stock purchased. An investor who did so would
have the same net value at year's end no matter what happened to the
stock price. If the stock went to $21 she would have one share of
stock and no option obligations outstanding. If the stock went to $45
she could buy two additional shares to satisfy her obligations under
the options; these transactions would result in a $24 loss but would
leave her with stock worth $45, for a net value of $21. Such a portfolio
would be risk-free because it has the same value no matter what hap-
pens. Its present value on Day 1 therefore should be the amount that,
if invested at the risk-free rate, would appreciate to $21 in one year, or
$19.09 on the facts assumed. Since the portfolio consists of the
purchase of one share of stock and the sale of two calls, and the stock
costs $30, the sale must yield $10.91 ($30 - $19.09), for a price of $5.46
per call.123
Reformulating the initial equivalence as an expression of the option
price, we may say that the purchase of two options is equal to the
purchase on Day 1 of one share of ABC stock and borrowing $19.09 at
the risk-free rate, or that a single call is equivalent to the purchase of
one-half of a share of the stock and borrowing $5.46:
Value of two calls = value of one share - $19.09 loan = $30 - $19.09 =
$10.91.
Value of one call = $5.46.
A number of consequences follow. First, the demonstration shows
that, at least in the case of a simplified option, it is possible to express
the option precisely in terms of positions in debt and equity-two in-
struments whose tax treatment is straightforward. As contrasted with
the analogical approach applied by other commentators, this equiva-
lence is exact; ownership of a simplified option is the same as asset
ownership plus borrowing. Second, the example supports the Cun-
ningham and Schenk view that the execution of a call option results in
a constructive disposition of a portion of the underlying property,
though it is not consistent with their treatment of the option as a dis-
position of solely a fixed part of the underlying property.
Finally, the result is consistent with the intuition that the extent of
the disposition is closely correlated with the extent of built-in gain in
122 See Haugen, note 118, at 432.
123 Amounts are rounded to nearest cent.
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the option. That is, as the exercise price drops relative to underlying
asset value, the price of the option increases, corresponding to a
deemed sale of a greater portion of the underlying asset on the option
sale date.1 24 The following modification of Example 6 corroborates
this principle.
Example 6A: The facts are the same as in Example 6, except
that the strike price of the option is $29.
In Example 6 an exercise price of $33 yielded a deemed purchase of
one-half of a share of ABC stock.' 25 If, as in Example 6A, the exercise
price drops to $29, the maximum option payoff is $16 ($45 - $29). The
maximum payoff from owning a share would still be $24 ($45 - $21),
or 1.5 call options. The value of 1.5 calls would be $10.91 ($30 -
$19.09), for a value of $7.27 for one call. The option purchase transac-
tion therefore would be treated as the purchase on Day 1 of two-
thirds of a share of stock for $20 and borrowing on that date of $12.73
to purchase two-thirds of a share on Day 2 for $14. It readily can be
seen that analogous results apply where the strike price of the call
option is higher-a lower portion of the underlying asset is deemed
purchased, and a lesser amount is borrowed.
As a first step to making this model explanatory for tax purposes, it
is necessary to complete the posited equivalence between a simplified
call option purchase and a stock purchase plus borrowing, by deeming
appropriate property dispositions and loan repayments to take
place.1 26 Under the facts of Example 6, the following constructive
transactions suggest themselves: On Day 1, A purchases one-half of a
share of ABC stock for its fair market value of $15 and borrows $9.54
at 10%. If the stock goes to $21 on Day 2, A would be deemed to sell
his one-half share of ABC stock at its fair market value on that date
and to use the proceeds to pay off the loan at $10.50. A would have a
capital loss of $4.50 on the stock 27 plus $.96 of interest expense, for a
net loss of $5.46. This loss is equal to the purchase price of the call
option. These transactions would leave A with no ABC stock, just as
124 The deemed sale of a greater portion is also consistent with the tax rule treating the
purchase of a deep-in-the-money option as a purchase of the underlying asset. See author-
ities cited in note 99; see also F.S.A. 200202057 (Jan. 11, 2002) (applying principles of Rev.
Rul. 85-87 to treat the sale of an in-the-money call option on stock as a sale of the underly-
ing stock).
125 This amount, called the option delta, generally is provided by the ratio of the range
of possible option values on the exercise date to the possible share price spread on that
date. In Example 6 the option delta is ($12 - $0)/($45 - $21) = 1/2.
126 It is important to keep in mind that these deemed transactions are just that-
deemed. The actual transaction is an option purchase, and the question is how to model it
with transactions that are economically equivalent.
127 $15 - $10.50 = ($4.50).
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in the worthless option case. If the stock went to $45 on Day 2, A
would be deemed to purchase an additional one-half share of ABC
stock on that day for its fair market value of $22.50 and to pay off the
loan for $10.50. These transactions would leave A with one share of
ABC stock worth $45 that was purchased for $37.50, for a capital gain
of $7.50, and offsetting interest expense of $.96, for a net gain of $6.54.
This amount equals the gain realized from the exercise of the option
($12) less the option's cost ($5.46).
At least in the case of a covered call-where the option writer owns
the underlying asset to be delivered if the option is exercised-it is
appropriate to treat the option writer as the counterparty to the op-
tion purchaser's constructive transactions. This treatment corre-
sponds to the division of benefits and burdens effected in the option
sale itself. In other words, the option purchaser's acquisition of a por-
tion of the underlying asset corresponds to the seller's disposition of
that portion. In Example 6, B may be viewed as selling A the one-half
share of stock on Day 1 and lending A the $9.54 needed to finance the
purchase of the remaining one-half share on the exercise date, leaving
B with the $5.46 option premium. This deemed sale treatment corre-
sponds to the reduced opportunity for gain that B enjoys as a result of
writing the call. On Day 2 B would be deemed either to sell the re-
maining one-half share at its Day 2 fair market value, or to repurchase
the one-half share deemed sold on the option purchase date at its
Day 2 fair market value, depending on whether the option is exercised
or lapses. This treatment essentially mirrors that of the purchaser.
Although intuitively appealing as a set of hypothesized transactions,
there is a problem with using this set of constructive dispositions to
understand the economic substance of a call option purchase. First,
even in the case of a covered call, it is hard to see how the seller of a
call option has sold a portion of the underlying asset to the option
purchaser on the option sale date, because the mere execution of a
call option contract does not transfer the benefits or burdens of own-
ership prior to exercise. Of course, I assumed these problems away in
Example 6 by using an asset, stock, that is essentially costless to own,
and by stipulating that the stock does not pay dividends. As a result,
ownership of the property confers neither benefits (apart from the
right to appreciation and voting rights) nor burdens (apart from the
risk of loss). It is, however, questionable to assert that B has trans-
ferred any of the indicia of ownership prior to Day 2 (if then), since
none of the features of a present property transfer seems to be present
in the transaction. Where the underlying asset throws off income, is
depreciable and/or has carrying or other costs associated with it, one
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would be more hard pressed to see how the purchaser receives this
income128 or bears the cost of producing it.
This problem becomes more acute in the case of a noncovered call,
where the option writer does not possess the underlying asset at the
time she sells the option:
Example 6B: The facts are the same as in Example 6, except
that B does not own any ABC stock unless and until immedi-
ately before A decides to exercise the option.
In this example, B remains fully at risk with respect to the ABC stock
that she must deliver should A exercise the option. If receipt of the
option payment transferred ownership in any meaningful sense, B
would no longer bear the risk associated with the option exercise-in
this case, $45. In the actual case where the underlying property could
increase in value indefinitely, this risk would in principle have no up-
per bound.
The preceding observations suggest that the analogy of an option
payment to the purchase of a portion of the underlying asset plus
some amount of borrowing needs refinement. Since the option effects
a transfer of the benefits and burdens of ownership that takes place, if
at all, only on exercise of the option, it would be more appropriate to
treat the option sale as a current borrowing and the disposition of a
future interest in the underlying asset. Under the facts of Example
6B, on Day 1 A would be deemed to buy a future interest in a one-half
share of ABC stock, with possession to take effect on Day 2, and to
borrow an additional amount, as described above. In the more com-
mon fact pattern where ownership of the underlying property brings
with it current costs and benefits, this approach preserves the underly-
ing economics while permitting the analysis of the option transaction
as the disposition of a portion of the underlying property. The princi-
ples of the previous Subsection would apply to this deemed forward
sale. The nonexercise case then can be understood as the immediate
transfer back, also on Day 2, of the portion of the underlying asset
deemed purchased on expiration of the option.
A's payment of $5.46 on Day 1 can be conceptualized as a purchase
plus borrowing. If the transaction is analyzed as the purchase of a
future interest, $15 must represent the present value of the future in-
terest in the one-half share of ABC stock that A receives on Day 1.
This conclusion follows from the fact that the deemed transfer of $15
on Day 1, together with borrowing equal to the value of one-half of a
128 If, for example, the underlying property were income-generating real estate, the
owner's execution of a purchase option on the property would not transfer the owner's
rights to the income prior to option exercise.
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share in the lapse case on Day 2, replicates the payoffs on the option
contract. Stated in the converse, on Day 2, A must receive property
the expected value of which on Day 1 was $15. Under the facts of the
example, this expected value is $16.50, or $15 invested at the risk-free
rate. 129 Accordingly, A must be viewed as paying $15 for a future
interest that increases in value over the option term, and as entering
into the previously described loan transaction.
With this analysis in hand, one can apply the approach of this Sub-
section to work through the tax treatment of the option. Since A is
required to repay the $9.54 loan on the exercise date at all events, A
should be treated as having interest expense, and B a corresponding
interest inclusion, that accrue over the option term. Because this in-
terest is fixed at the outset of the transaction, the OID rules should
govern the expense and inclusion, subject to the usual deduction
limitations.
The deemed stock transfers are nearly as straightforward. Assume
that B's basis in the ABC stock on Day 1 is $30, its fair market value.
B must allocate that basis between the sold and retained portions
based on their relative fair market values. Since, by the terms of the
example, the ABC stock pays no dividends, all of the value should be
attributed to the sold portion (though that would not be the case
under the more realistic scenario in which the underlying asset pro-
duces income and/or Ioss).13 ° For this reason, B also does not have an
offsetting $1.50 of "loss" during the term of the option. Accordingly,
under the ordinary allocation rule B would have no gain or loss on
receipt of the option premium, notwithstanding her net $5.46 cash on
hand following the option sale; the premium is actually what remains
after constructively selling one-half of a share forward and lending A
$9.54 immediately thereafter. On Day 2, B will either receive the one-
half share sold to A in satisfaction of the loan or sell her remaining
129 To say that the expected value is $16.50 is to say that on average the ex ante value of
the one-half share of ABC stock on Day 2 must be $16.50, even though in any given case
(under the facts assumed) it will be either $10.50 or $22.50. If the expected value were not
$16.50, an investor would have an opportunity for riskless arbitrage. To see this, consider
the cases where the expected value differs from $16.50. If it was greater, the investor could
ensure a profit by borrowing at 10%, purchasing the stock at the current price, and selling
it short at the Day 2 spot price. The proceeds of the short sale would exceed the interest
due on the loan. If the expected value were less than $16.50, the investor could borrow the
stock, sell it to a third party for $15, purchase the stock forward for its present value (which
would be less than $15) and pocket the difference between $15 and that present value. On
Day 2 she would close out the stock borrowing with the forward-purchased stock.
130 Arguably a source of value during the option term even in the nondividend paying
case is the opportunity to use the stock as a hedge or a speculative investment, if the value
fluctuated unpredictably during the term. For purposes of illustration I assume it to be
zero. I also disregard the value of voting rights, a simplifying assumption that has no
meaningful impact on the analysis in the case of large, publicly-traded corporations.
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one-half share to A, depending on whether the option lapses or is ex-
ercised, respectively, in either case at the fair market value of the one-
half share on Day 2. In the lapse case B takes a $10.50 basis in the
one-half share received in satisfaction of the loan, leaving her with
one full share that has a fair market value of $21 and an adjusted basis
of $25.50. In the exercise case she sells the remaining one-half share
to A for $22.50 and receives $10.50 in loan proceeds, netting a $7.50
gain, which she recognizes.
A's treatment is largely complementary, except that she accrues the
$1.50 of interest-like income over the option term, 31 with appropriate
upward adjustments of basis. In the nonexercise case A ends up with
$6 of capital loss on the deemed transfer back of the one-half share to
B for $10.50 in satisfaction of the loan ($16.50 adjusted basis less
$10.50 value on disposition). In the exercise case, she purchases the
remaining one-half share at $22.50 and repays the loan with cash at
$10.50, taking a $39 basis in the stock ($16.50 basis in the already-
acquired one-half-share plus $22.50 basis in the remaining one-half
share). Note that in both cases, these tax rules accord to each of A
and B one-half of the loss or gain in the full ABC share over the op-
tion term, adjusted to account for the fact that the purchaser has ex-
pected gain in the form of deemed appreciation. This result is
consistent with the analysis that treats the writing of the option, on
these facts, as a constructive future disposition of one-half of the un-
derlying property.
The tax analysis for the option writer who has built-in gain or loss in
the underlying asset is not in principle any different. For example, if B
had a $5 basis in the ABC stock on Day 1, then under the approach
advocated here B would be treated as realizing $12.50 of gain on that
day ($15 deemed received for the one-half share sold forward on that
day less the $2.50 basis allocable to it). Recognition of the gain on
Day 1 reflects the analysis of a call option as the disposition on that
day of a piece of the underlying property. Although the possibility of
nonexercise, or "repurchase," is intrinsic to the option transaction, the
equivalence between the simple option of Example 6 and a purchase
plus borrowing demonstrates that the option transaction is in effect a
closing out of the option seller's position with respect to a portion of
the benefit (and risk) associated with owning the underlying asset.
This closing out both is reflected in the fact that the repurchase, if any,
is at the fair market value of the option on the lapse date, and what
authorizes current taxation under a realization-based system of taxa-
tion, since the surrender of opportunity for gain and risk of loss pro-
131 Presumably, she would do this using the constant yield-to-maturity method of the
OID rules. See IRC §§ 1272-75.
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vides the occasion for imposition of tax. 132 Indeed, the receipt of the
option premium indicates that the sale of the one-half share is in ef-
fect complete on Day 1; that premium reflects the locking-in of gain
(or loss) with respect to a portion of the underlying property.
ii. Extension to Actual Call Option
The preceding discussion set forth a proposed tax analysis for a sim-
plified call option, in which it was stipulated that the underlying asset
would have one of just two values on the strike date. In order to con-
clude that this analysis is fruitful for actual options, in which the un-
derlying asset may take on any non-negative value on the strike date,
the simplified option must be generalized to the real case.
As indicated above, Black and Scholes derived the formula for the
price of an actual call option on non-dividend-paying stock. Their
method was to treat the option as the limit of a series of simplified
options of the kind described in Example 6. The intuition behind this
approach is that one arrives at increasingly accurate approximations
of a true option as one shortens the interval between option purchase
and option exercise or lapse. For instance, one would more closely
approximate a true option sold on Day 1 and exercisable on Day 2 by
modeling the option as the outcome of two simplified options of the
kind sold in Example 6. The first such option would expire halfway
between Days 1 and 2, at which time the underlying asset would take
on one of two values. The second would expire on Day 2, at which
time the underlying asset would take on one of two values for each of
its possible values on the expiration date of the first option. At the
limit, one may consider an actual option as the result of an infinite
series of such mini-options, each of which is open for an infinitesimal
period of time and each of which permits an infinitesimal variation,
positive or negative, of the underlying asset's price at exercise or lapse
from its price on the mini-option's sale date. The result is a model of
the real option as one of continuous property purchases, sales, and
repurchases together with borrowings, repayments, and new
borrowings.
The question becomes how to extend the tax rules described for the
simple case to this model of continuous hedging.
Example 7: ABC stock is worth $30 on Day 1 and has mod-
erate volatility of 30%. On Day 1, when the risk-free rate of
interest is 10%, B sells A an option to buy ABC stock at $33
132 See discussion in Section III.A.
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on Day 2, one year later. The price of the option is $3.64.133
At all times from Day 1 to Day 2 B is the record owner of
the ABC stock. ABC stock pays no dividends.
Under Black-Scholes, the option in Example 7 would be reformulated
as the forward purchase on Day 1 of approximately 56.75% of the
underlying property, together with a borrowing of $13.39, subject to
continuous adjustment.134 These figures are determined by the option
delta, which is a measure of the sensitivity of a change in option price
to a change in the price of the underlying asset. In Example 7 the
option delta is .5675, which means that a perfect hedge for ownership
of one share of ABC stock on Day 1 would require the sale of 1.77
options.' 35 That is:
S - 1.77Op = Z,
where S is a share of ABC stock, Op is the option, Z is a zero coupon
bond issued at $23.56 and earning interest at the riskless rate, and the
minus sign indicates a sale. Solving the equation for Op yields the
extent of the share ownership and borrowing necessary to mimic the
option on Day 1. Because the stock may take on any nonnegative
value on Day 2, the preservation of this equivalence between the op-
tion and the borrowing and purchasing over time would require A to
hedge continuously; that is, at each instant she would have to sell or
buy differing amounts of the ABC stock and increase or pay down the
principal on her loan accordingly. Because the exact amount neces-
sary to effect these hypothetical additional purchases or sales and re-
payments or loans always would be provided by the value of the
combined position at the immediately preceding instant, she would
incur no additional cost as long as she hedged continuously. 136 If,
however, she did not hedge, her position would diverge from that of
ownership of the option.
Thus, suppose that immediately prior to Day 2 the option is in the
money. At that time the option delta is 1, because the option is cer-
tain to be exercised and the only way to hedge ownership of the stock
133 This is the value of the option under the Black-Scholes model. One can obtain such
values easily with the aid of financial calculators, some of which are available on the In-
ternet. See, e.g., http://www.blobek.com/black-scholes.html (providing a Black-Scholes op-
tion calculator for hypothetical options on hypothetical stock). Volatility is a measure of
the expected fluctuation of the stock price and typically may be derived from historical
data or other information, such as the nature of the company's business. See Haugen, note
118, at 439-40.
134 See Haugen, note 118, at 439-40.
135 That is, 1/.5675.
136 Any increase in value of the option would be reflected in additional borrowing that
would be used to finance additional purchases of fractional amounts of the underlying
asset; declines would require repayment of loans through deemed sales of fractional
amounts of the underlying asset. See Haugen, note 118, at 436-40.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
2004]
HeinOnlin   -- 57 Tax L. Rev. 439 2003-2004
TAX LAW REVIEW
would be to sell one option, whose price on that day would be infini-
tesimally greater than the difference between the asset price and the
strike price. 137 If A had been continuously hedging, her position
therefore would be full ownership of the underlying asset and borrow-
ing in an equal amount. Conversely, if the stock were out of the
money immediately before Day 2, the option delta would be zero and
under continuous hedging A's ownership and borrowing would be
zero. In either case, the tax rules must account for the deemed change
in ownership and borrowing between Days 1 and 2 as well as for the
exercise or lapse of the option on Day 2.
The question for tax purposes is how to apply the basic rules for the
known option equivalents-debt and equity-to these deemed trans-
actions. Consider first the exercise case. For any exercise, no matter
how the ratios and timing of purchases and borrowing for the period
break down, the total amount of A's payment must be the option cost
($33) together with the strike price ($3.64), or $36.64. In principle the
exact breakdown could be quite difficult to calculate, because the
stock price may fluctuate substantially over the course of the option
term and the precise amount of deemed stock ownership and borrow-
ing at any given time will fluctuate as well. Further, the price paid for
incremental purchases and sales of portions of the underlying asset
generally will vary with the stock price, so that A's basis will depend
not just on the stock price on the strike date but also on the price path
of the stock between the option sale date and the strike date. For
instance, in Example 7 the ABC stock could undergo a number of
increases and declines in value, possibly above the strike price and/or
below $30, respectively, prior to Day 2. Under Black-Scholes, A
would take these price changes into account through deemed
purchases and sales of fractional shares of ABC stock at the spot
prices, together with increases or reductions in her borrowing. As a
result, there would be no unique basis or total interest due for any
given initial option price and final asset price on the strike date. Basis
and interest due also would depend on how the asset got to that price
from its price on the option sale date. Finally, even if it were possible
to account for all of these fluctuations, any effort to do so would be
administratively unwieldy. Accordingly, it appears that mark-to-mar-
ket tax accounting for options treated as a combination of borrowing
and asset purchases under the Black-Scholes model would not be
feasible.
137 That is, the owner of one share of ABC stock immediately prior to Day 2 who
wanted to hedge that ownership with an in-the-money option whose strike price is $33 and
exercise date is Day 2 would sell the option. This position is equivalent to ownership of a
zero coupon bond with a principal amount of $33 that earns 10% and matures the instant
after it is issued.
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Similar problems arise in the nonexercise case. The net result of an
option lapse is an expense to the option purchaser equal to the option
price (plus forgone interest). As in the exercise case, the breakdown
of this cost between loss on the underlying asset and interest expense
depends on the price path of the underlying asset. Where, for exam-
ple, the asset rapidly declined in value and remained low, the bulk of
the cost would be capital loss. Where the asset appreciated and then
dropped in value below the exercise price shortly before the exercise
date, the holder would have high deemed interest expense as well.
Under realization-based taxation, however, it may make sense to
adopt some simplifying assumptions about the option's value. The
most natural of these might be to continue to apply the realization
rule's presumption of constant asset value to the underlying property
as long as the option is open. Under this approach the normal deter-
minants of option price would continue to operate, but on the assump-
tion that one of the determinants-the price of the subject property-
remained constant. This approach, however, would tend to produce
counterintuitive results. One reason is that the model of option own-
ership, unlike ownership of the underlying asset, intrinsically involves
dynamic hedging, or deemed continuous selling and repurchasing of
fractional amounts of the asset. If one assumes values of the asset at
variance from its true value, then one must posit arm's length con-
structive sales and repurchases at prices that diverge from market
prices, and it is unclear why parties would engage in such transactions.
More fundamentally, this assumption departs from the basic circum-
stance that supports the realization rule,. which is nondisposition of the
asset. Presumed nondisposition does not seem appropriate where the
equivalence between the option and stock ownership plus borrowing
involves dynamic hedging of the asset, not holding it. In short, be-
cause dynamic hedging involves deemed continuous realizations of
the underlying property, the realization rule does not support disre-
garding, for tax purposes, what happens to the asset while the option
is open.
Nor do the standard administrative justifications for applying the
realization rule to the underlying asset carry over easily to the option
context. Assumption of a constant underlying asset value does not
resolve any liquidity concerns, because deemed dispositions still
would generate taxable gain and loss, as would deemed interest pay-
ments, without any cash actually changing hands. The assumption of
constant asset value would make valuation easier, but valuation
should not pose a particular problem in the option context, because
options involving publicly-traded property are easily valued, while the
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value of other options should be subject to reasonable
approximation.138
To see the difficulties this approach entails, consider again Example
7. If one assumes that the ABC stock is worth exactly $30 per share
while the option is held, the option delta will decline to zero between
Day 1 and Day 2 as the option is deemed to fall farther and farther
out of the money. The declining option delta means that A would be
deemed to sell fractional shares of ABC stock and to reduce her bor-
rowing. Except in the rare case where the ABC stock actually main-
tained its $30 per share value, the deemed resales would be off-market
transactions in which A would be selling fractional shares back to B at
prices different from their fair market values. These deemed sales
would be especially troubling where the option actually became more
valuable, because in that circumstance A should be deemed to be
purchasing fractional shares from B.
Another approach would carry the realization rule over to the op-
tion itself and assume that the option retains its value during the op-
tion term, for as long as it is held by the original purchaser. This
assumption is at least more consistent with economic reality, since the
option price purports to reflect the actual value of the option in an
efficient market. 139 As a practical matter, however, the same difficul-
ties noted under the constant asset price assumption would apply to
this approach, because it too would assign values to the underlying
asset that are inconsistent with the deemed treatment of the asset by
the option holder whenever the presumed option price differed from
its actual price. The result again would require deemed off-market
transactions in most circumstances. Continuing with Example 7,
under a constant option value assumption, the asset price would be
deemed to move by the strike date to a point in excess of the exercise
price equal to the option price.140 This assumption would require
deemed purchases of additional ABC stock as the option delta moved
towards one on Day 2, reflecting the assumption that the option
138 See Kayle, note 109, at 276-77.
139 To be completely accurate it would be necessary to impute an increase in value of the
option at the risk-free rate.
140 That is, as the exercise date approaches, an increasing percentage of the option's
value is attributable to the extent to which it was in the money on the option purchase
date, because any value attributable to the likelihood of wide variation in the underlying
asset price prior to option exercise decreases. At the limit, where the option is sold imme-
diately prior to exercise, all of the value is attributable to the extent to which the option is
in the money. See Brealey & Myers, note 98, at 578 (noting that the value of a call certain
to be exercised is equal to the stock price less the present value of the exercise price).
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would be exercised.14 ' Suppose, however, that the asset price actually
remained constant. The result would be deemed purchases of addi-
tional stock, but at an off-market price, and indeed at one that would
support deemed sales of additional stock under the dynamic hedging
model of option pricing, not deemed purchases.
The foregoing considerations suggest that something like a modified
mark-to-market approach for option pricing would make the most
sense. For reasons that will become apparent, I refer to this approach
as "quasi-mark-to-market." Some form of mark-to-market taxation is
necessary for options because only a rule that reflects economic real-
ity at the close of the taxing period will assign asset values to construc-
tive asset purchases and dispositions during the period that
correspond to the prices at which these purchases and dispositions ac-
tually could have taken place given the option values at the beginning
and end of the period, even on the assumption of a simplified path for
the option price. In other words, an approach that takes periodic val-
uation into account is necessary because the Black-Scholes model of
dynamic hedging treats an option as equivalent to a series of on-mar-
ket transactions. Unless one is willing to posit off-market transac-
tions, a simplifying assumption must be backward looking.
Conversely, if one simplified using off-market transactions to approxi-
mate option transactions, one would substantially undercut the utility
of using the dynamic hedging model in the first place, because the
value of the model lies in its establishment of transactional
equivalents. Finally, there does not seem to be any compelling policy
reason not to adopt a quasi-mark-to-market approach for option
transactions. The basic substantive rationale that I argue supports
wait-and-see taxation for ordinary capital assets does not apply to op-
tions because, in fact, they represent continuous realizations. 142 Valu-
ation should not present any problems for most option transactions,
and for those that involve nonpublicly traded property one ought to
be able to apply simplifying assumptions about the asset's value at the
close of the relevant taxing period that offer a reasonable approxima-
tion.1 43 Liquidity under a quasi-mark-to-market approach is of no
more concern in the option context than in other similar contexts in
which the Code applies mark-to-market taxation, including certain fu-
141 This assumption would apply to all options and follows from the fact that all options
have value. Since the only way an option maintains its value on the exercise date is for the
option to be "in the money," the delta must be one.
142 See text accompanying notes 133-38.
143 The tax law already makes such assumptions in certain contexts. See, e.g., IRC
§ 1274 (using applicable federal interest rate to determine whether there is unstated inter-
est on certain debt instruments issued in exchange for certain nonpublicly traded
property).
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tures and forward contracts, to say nothing of other contexts in which
the tax law may require payment of tax without proceeds to fund the
payment. 144
Note that an appropriate mark-to-market treatment of options
could be simplifying; it could avoid the difficulty of actually computing
the spot prices of the option on a daily basis (or in principle even
more frequently). What is essential is merely that the simplifying as-
sumptions fit with a set of hypothesized transactions that could have
taken place during the taxable period, given the values of the option
at the beginning and end of the period. This requirement ensures that
the analysis does not presuppose net off-market transactions, a result
that the previous approaches did not achieve. Such a quasi-mark-to-
market approach offers the best prospect for accurate and workable
tax rules for options. It would begin with the actual option prices at
the beginning and end of the taxable period and then impute a simpli-
fied path to the option price during the period; the tax consequences
under dynamic hedging then would be derived from the path. A num-
ber of distinct assumptions about the shape of the path could be ap-
plied. For example, the tax law could assume appreciation or decline
in value of the option during the tax period on a constant yield-to-
maturity basis, akin to the rules for debt with OID. As an alternative,
a ratable method similar to the rules that apply to market discount
bonds could apply. Probably the easiest assumption is simply that the
increases or reductions in the amount of deemed asset purchase or
sale and borrowing or repayment themselves occurred ratably over
the relevant period. 145 This assumption would permit the easiest com-
putation of net capital gain or loss and interest expense.
By way of illustration, consider again the case in which the price of
the ABC stock in Example 7 increased to $35.08 on the last day of A's
taxable year, six months after Day 1. On that day, A's option would
be worth $5 and the option delta would be .7357, so that A would be
deemed to have purchased forward an additional .1682 shares of ABC
stock between Day 1 and the close of her taxable year. A would fi-
nance the forward stock purchase through additional borrowing se-
cured by the increase in value of the stock already deemed owned by
A by reason of the purchase of the option on Day 1. The amount of
additional borrowing would be $6.77.146 Under an assumption of rata-
144 See, e.g., IRC § 1259 (constructive disposition rules for appreciated financial posi-
tions), Temp. Reg. § 15A.453-1(c) (contingent payment installment sales).
145 Note that this assumption in general would not correspond to a linear increase or
decrease in the price of the underlying asset during the taxable period.
146 The deemed borrowing can be derived from the formula that equates the purchase of
a zero coupon bond with the purchase of stock plus the sale of some number of call
options:
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ble increases in both the asset price and borrowing, A would be
treated as having borrowed one-half of the additional $6.77 at 10% for
six months, generating $.12 of interest expense above the expense in-
curred by reason of the deemed initial borrowing of $13.39.147
The treatment of the increase in the amount of stock that A would
be deemed to purchase forward is analogous, but open to at least two
interpretations for tax purposes. Because A in fact is no more out of
pocket at the close of her taxable year than she was once she had
purchased the option, the deemed additional borrowing and apprecia-
tion in the stock already deemed owned must finance all of the
deemed forward purchase. The interpretive issue is whether to treat
these forward purchases of fractional parts of the underlying asset as
the result of constructive sales of the entire interest owned, followed
by constructive repurchases of that interest plus an incremental
amount, or simply as the result of constructive purchases of these in-
cremental amounts. That is, in the example of a continuously increas-
ing option delta, after initially buying a fraction of the stock, A could
be viewed as immediately selling this fraction at an infinitesimally
higher price, and then buying an infinitesimally larger fraction than
she initially purchased with the proceeds of that sale. Alternatively,
subsequent increases in deemed ownership could be viewed as the re-
sult of her purchase of just the incremental additional amount of
stock, without a sale and repurchase of the amount initially purchased.
Under the first interpretation she continuously would realize income
from the sale or exchange of property; under the second she simply
would add to her ownership and so would realize no gain.
Fundamentally, there is no "right" answer in terms of the theory of
the Black-Scholes model, because economically the two sets of
deemed transactions are the same, and Black-Scholes purports only to
establish economic equivalents. Instead, the tax result depends on the
answer to the policy question of whether it is appropriate to tax the
gain on the value of the underlying asset during the pendency of the
option or to wait until some future date, such as exercise or, more
S - (Op/delta) = Z,
where S is share price, or $35.08, Op is option price, or $5, delta is the option delta, or
.7357, and Z is the zero coupon bond that is replicated by this transaction. Rearranging:
delta*S - Op = delta*Z,
where delta*Z is the total amount of borrowing that, together with the deemed ABC stock
purchase, replicates the option purchase under the Black-Scholes formula. See text at
notes 119-21. Under the assumptions set forth in the text, Z is $20.81. The amount initially
borrowed was $13.39; over six months $.65 would have accrued as interest, for a total of
$14.04, so that an additional $6.77 would have been borrowed. Id.
147 Interest expense incurred by reason of the change in the option price would be ap-
proximated by assuming an average balance throughout the period of one-half the addi-
tional borrowing, or $3.385, at 10%.
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realistically, ultimate disposition of the asset itself. In essence this
question is similar to the question whether borrowing without re-
course against untaxed appreciation should be taxed. In both the ap-
preciating option and the nonrecourse borrowing cases the owner of
property finances additional purchases by borrowing against built-in
gain in the property, without any personal liability for the debt. In the
abstract, such borrowing probably should be treated as a taxable reali-
zation, because it is economically indistinguishable from cashing out
the gain.148 In practice, however, the answer has long been that such
borrowing is not taxable. 149 Extension of the operative rule to option
transactions taxed under Black-Scholes therefore would maintain con-
tinuity in the tax law, but at the expense of economic inaccuracy.
Conversely, if the built-in gain in options were taxed there would be
greater accuracy, but this rule would create a discontinuity in the tax
law that might encourage arbitrage or simply inefficient transactions
that were alternatives to options but that enjoyed better tax treat-
ments. 150 In the absence of more general reform with respect to the
taxation of cashed-out unrealized appreciation, these considerations
suggest it is probably better not to tax this gain. On the other hand,
an incremental reform that would substantially increase accuracy in
the tax law would be to treat such cashing out, whether by sale of a
put, the purchase of insurance, or any like transaction, as a realization
event.151
There is a further wrinkle on this question. If deemed borrowing
against deemed appreciation in option transactions goes untaxed, then
there will be an asymmetry between options with increasing option
deltas and those with declining option deltas. Recall that the decline
in the option delta represents deemed sales of the underlying property
together with reductions in overall deemed borrowing. Under either
interpretation of the deemed transactions under Black-Scholes, these
sales generate loss from the sale or exchange of property. Because
such asymmetries invite abuse, it would appear that the deemed
purchases in the case of rising option deltas should be taxed.
148 See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro, Risk and Accrual: The Tax Treatment of Nonrecourse
Debt, 44 Tax L. Rev. 401, 408 (1989).
149 See Woodsam v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357, 359 (2d Cir. 1952).
150 As an example, the taxpayer could purchase insurance against the decline in value of
property as an alternative to purchasing a put option on it. See Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules,
note 1, at 648-50.
151 As discussed in greater detail below, the Code already provides for such treatment in
certain cases in which the taxpayer also disposes of the opportunity for gain or otherwise
exchanges risk-based for fixed returns. See IRC §§ 1258-1260. It is not clear why the rule
could not be expanded to deal with cases in which the taxpayer eliminates solely the risk of
loss. See generally, Schenk, note 21 (proposing such a rule).
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If incremental gains in the underlying asset are taxed under this ap-
proach, then under the quasi-mark-to-market approach, it is necessary
to distinguish the amount of gain in the fractional share deemed
owned throughout the period from the gain in the fractional shares
purchased during the period. Returning to Example 7, with respect to
the first, A's gain is simply the difference between .5675 shares of
ABC stock at $35.08 and at $30, or $2.88. The second is $.43 and is
given by the difference between the closing price of the ABC stock
and its average price during the period, or $32.54, assuming a constant
change in the quantity of stock owned and in its price. Assuming
quasi-mark-to-market did apply, A would treat the extent of addi-
tional borrowing as realized short-term capital gain (unless she were a
dealer or the ABC stock were otherwise not a capital asset in her
hands1 52).
The only remaining piece of the option transaction that generates
tax consequences is the portion of any gain or loss resulting from the
fact that the deemed purchase is a purchase forward, that is, a tempo-
ral carve-out transaction. The tax rules must account for the gain and
loss that arises as a result of this aspect of the option, just as in the
simple forward contract described in Section III.A. Again, a simplify-
ing assumption very like the one that applies to the interest and capi-
tal portions of the option could approximate this value. In Example 7,
the .5675 shares A purchased forward would be deemed held for the
entire option period, while a fraction of the balance representing the
average amount held for the period also would be deemed owned.
b. Put Option
It is easy to show that put options should enjoy treatment analogous
to that for call options. Like the sale of a call, one may analyze the
sale of a put as the disposition of a part of the underlying property
together with a loan transaction. In the put option context, however,
the purchaser of the option, rather than the seller, sells a portion of
the underlying property and acts as a lender. That is:
Put purchase = Partial Sale + Lending.
This result follows from the equivalence established by the put-call
parity theorem.153 This theorem states that for any option exercise
price the combination of the purchase of a call option and the invest-
ment of cash at the risk-free rate in an amount sufficient to yield the
strike price of the option on the strike date is equivalent to the
152 See IRC § 1221(a).
153 Warren, note 1 at 465-67. The equivalence assumes the underlying property gener-
ates no income during the pendency of the options.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
2004]
HeinOnlin   -- 57 Tax L. Rev. 447 2003-2004
purchase of a put option with the same strike price and strike date
together with ownership of the underlying asset. 154 That is:
Call + ZCB = Asset + Put,
where ZCB is a zero coupon bond paying the strike price of the op-
tions on their strike date. If on the strike date the asset has appreci-
ated above the strike price, the owner of the instruments on the right-
hand side of the equation will be left with the asset and a valueless
put, and the owner of the instruments on the left side will have a
bond, the proceeds of which exactly equal the strike price of the call
option, which she will exercise. If the asset declines below the ex-
pected value, the owner of the instruments on the right-hand side will
exercise the put and be left with cash equal to the face amount of the
ZCB; the call will be worthless.
One can rearrange the terms of the algebraic equivalence to arrive
at expressions for its individual elements. In particular:
Put = Call - Asset + ZCB,
where the minus sign indicates a sale. This equation states that the
purchase of a put option is equivalent to the purchase of a call with
the same strike price and strike date, the sale of the asset, and the
purchase of a zero coupon bond whose payment at maturity is the
strike price of the put and call. A call option is economically
equivalent to the forward purchase of some portion of the underlying
asset coupled with borrowing. Making this substitution, one arrives at
the following equivalence for put options:
Put = (Partial Asset Purchase + Partial Borrowing) - Asset + ZCB.
Since both the implied asset purchase of the call and the implied bor-
rowing are always less than the full value of the underlying prop-
erty,1 55 one can simplify the above as follows:
Put = Partial Asset Sale + Partial Lending.
The equivalence established by the put-call parity theorem demon-
strates that the same basic analysis operative in the call option context
applies to put options. The option writer is deemed to buy a future
interest in the property on the option sale date and to borrow in order
to finance the purchase of an equivalent amount on the exercise date.
If the option is not exercised, the option writer is deemed to repay the
debt with the property purchased; if it is exercised, the option writer
154 See Charles T. Terry, Option Pricing Theory and the Economic Incentive Analysis of
Nonrecourse Acquisition Liabilities, 12 Am. J. Tax Pol'y 273, 342-43 (1995). Terry's article
offers a lucid explication of option pricing theory.
155 This reflects the fact that the upper limit of the cost of a call option is the current cost
of the asset subject to the option. See generally Brealey & Myers, note 98, ch. 20. An
option with this price is simply a forward purchase of the underlying asset. See text accom-
panying notes 134-36.
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repays the debt and purchases the balance of the underlying asset at
its fair market value on the strike date:
Example 8: ABC stock, worth $30 on Day 1, will be worth
either $21 or $45 on Day 2, one year after Day 1. On Day 1
A sells B an option to sell A one share of ABC stock at $29,
exercisable only on Day 2. On Day 1, the risk-free interest
rate is 10%. At all times from Day 1 to Day 2 B is the record
owner of the ABC stock. ABC stock pays no dividends.
The option described in Example 8 is the put version of that described
in Example 6A. As indicated in that example, if Example 8 described
a call option giving A the right to purchase the stock on Day 2 at $29,
A would pay $7.27 for the call. This payment would represent the
constructive purchase on Day 1 of two-thirds of a share of ABC stock
forward and borrowing, also on Day 1, of two-thirds of the present
value of $21 on Day 2. If the option lapsed, A would constructively
repay the loan with the forward-purchased two-thirds of a share, and
if the option were exercised, A would repay the loan and purchase an
additional one-third of a share at the present value of $15.
One can use the equivalences established by the put-call parity the-
orem to determine the extent of the sale and borrowing that this op-
tion implies, recognizing that subtraction of an asset is equivalent to
selling it and that the purchase of a zero coupon bond is equivalent to
lending the principal amount of the bond with full interest and princi-
pal payable at maturity:
Put = (2/3 Forward Purchase + 2/3 Low-value Share Borrowing) +
Asset Sale + ZCB
or:
Put = 1/3 Forward Sale + Lending of (PV of strike price - 2/3 Low-
value Share Borrowing).
The above equivalence states that when restructured as a put option,
the transaction becomes equivalent to A's forward purchase of one-
third of the ABC stock for $10 and borrowing the difference between
the present value of the $29 strike price ($26.37) and the present value
of two-thirds of $21 ($12.73), or $13.64. This yields a price for the put
option of $3.64 ($13.64 - $10). It is a straightforward matter to carry
through tax treatment for the put option that is analogous to that sug-
gested for the call option.
3. Conclusion on Options
The availability of the dynamic hedging model for options suggests
that their tax treatment can be made consistent with the tax law's ba-
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sic distinction between wait-and-see taxation for unrealized capital
gains and accrual or other forms of current taxation (such as expected
value) for other kinds of returns. Even a simplified dynamic hedging
model offers this advantage; its significance derives from its elimina-
tion of substantial arbitrage opportunities available under current law,
especially given the ubiquity of option or option equivalents in finan-
cial products. Under the dynamic hedging model, discontinuities with
forward contracts (which, as discussed below, are often similar to op-
tion contracts) are essentially eliminated, as are opportunities to ex-
ploit the hidden interest element in options as contrasted with debt
instruments.
IV. APPLICATIONS
Sections II and III offered, respectively, a defense of a circum-
scribed sphere of application for the realization rule and an account of
how the rule applies to carved-out property interests. Perhaps the
most important conclusion of the preceding discussion is that the real-
ization rule is not inconsistent with current accrual of income and ex-
pense for either temporal divisions of property or risk-based
divisions-the former because associated income and loss are not due
to the assumption of "investment risk," and the latter because associ-
ated income and loss arise from deemed dispositions of assets, not
from simply holding them. If the realization rule is consistent with
expected value taxation on temporal carve-out transactions and mark-
to-market or quasi-mark-to-market taxation of option transactions,
then some form of accrual taxation can apply to many modern finan-
cial instruments in a manner consistent with realization taxation for
traditional capital assets, such as stock and debt.
Further, since there is little justification for extending realization-
based taxation to risky returns from non-investment-based risks, there
is no deep policy reason, apart from administrative difficulties or wor-
ries about arbitrage opportunities, for retaining the realization doc-
trine for those financial products that do not represent the assumption
of investment risk. Neither Congress nor Treasury would do violence
to the original scope of realization taxation by removing these prod-
ucts from realization accounting, in whole or part, if administrative
considerations supported such a switch; such a move also would do
little violence to the tax treatment of holders of traditional instru-
ments, such as basic stock and debt. Assuming valuation and liquidity
do not figure into the analysis, there is no inconsistency in applying
expected value, mark-to-market, or other tax regimes to these instru-
ments. By the same token, however, there may be continuity- and
consistency-based reasons for subjecting contingent returns from cer-
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tain financial instruments to realization taxation or for treating them
as capital assets, even if they do not involve the assumption of invest-
ment risk.
This Section illustrates how one might construct rules that embody
these principles for forward contracts and CDIs. These instruments
represent two of the more important types of derivative financial in-
struments that are apt to involve the assumption of investment risk.
A. Forward Contracts
A forward contract, or forward, is a privately negotiated sales con-
tract that entitles the purchaser to delivery of an asset at some time in
the future.156 If the purchaser pays for the asset prior to delivery the
forward contract is a prepaid forward (PPF). If the parties net out
their positions in the contract through a cash payment in lieu of the
seller's delivery of the underlying asset, the contract is cash-settled. 157
Forwards are important in the present context because of their fre-
quent use as risk-management instruments or to speculate on price
movements1 58 and because they can form parts of other financial con-
tracts, such as NPCs or CDIs.
Example 9: On Day 1, B agrees to pay $100 to A on Day 2,
two years hence, in exchange for the receipt, also on Day 2,
of 100 shares of ABC stock from A. A holds the ABC stock
as a capital asset with an adjusted basis on Day 1 of $75.
Example 9 describes a simple forward contract. If, instead of paying
$100 on Day 2, B pays for the stock on Day 1, the contract is a PPF.159
The contract is cash-settled if, instead of delivering the stock to B on
Day 2 in exchange for $100 (or for some lesser amount beforehand),
A agrees with B that the party whose position is out of the money will
pay the counterparty the difference between the contract price and
the price of that position. For example, if on Day 2 100 shares of ABC
stock are worth $50, B could cash-settle the contract by paying A $50.
If the shares are worth $125, A could cash-settle by paying B $25. A
forward contract may, of course, be both a PPF and cash-settled.
156 See Shuldiner, General Approach, note 6, at 304.
157 A futures contract, another common financial product, is a species of forward con-
tract to which the analysis offered here would apply. A futures contract is a cash-settled
forward contract negotiated on an exchange rather than privately. Currently regulated
futures contracts are subject to the mark-to-market rules of § 1256. IRC § 1256(b)(1), (g);
see Levy, Equal Tax Treatment, note 80, at 478 (describing futures contracts).
158 See Levy, Equal Tax Treatment, note 80, at 478-79.
159 In that circumstance B would pay less for the stock than $100, reflecting the time
value of money. See Levy, Equal Tax Treatment, note 80, at 481-82.
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Sections 1001, 1223, and 1234A generally govern the taxation of for-
ward contracts, with exceptional treatment for certain positions de-
scribed in §§ 1092, 1256, 1258, 1259, or 1260. In the case of a forward
contract for property not subject to exceptional treatment, the execu-
tion of the contract generally has no immediate tax consequences.1 60
If the underlying property is delivered pursuant to the contract, the
buyer takes a basis equal to the purchase price 61 and the seller recog-
nizes gain or loss equal to the difference between the sale price and
the seller's adjusted basis.' 62 Character depends on the nature of the
underlying property in the seller's hands, and the holding period is
determined by reference to the date the property is transferred, not
the date the contract is entered into.163 These results are no different
from the sale of property under an ordinary contract in which execu-
tion and delivery are contemporaneous.
If the contract is cash-settled, the above rules generally apply, ex-
cept that the parties treat any gain or loss realized as capital gain or
loss so long as the property is or would be a capital asset in the hands
of the taxpayer. 64 The same rule applies to a party that disposes of its
rights or obligation under the contract to a third party prior to the
delivery date or who cancels or terminates her obligations under the
contract. 165
The rules described above do not apply to forward contracts that
qualify as legs of a straddle under § 1092,166 as certain "section 1256
160 This result apparently does not change when the contract is a PPF. See, e.g., N.Y. St.
Bar Ass'n Tax Sec., Timing and Character Rules for Prepaid Forwards and Options, 91 Tax
Notes 816 n.3 (Apr. 30, 2001) [hereinafter NYSBA Report] ("Although there is no clear
authority for the treatment of prepaid forwards under current law, it is generally believed
that sellers who receive a prepayment on a prepaid forward do not have income as long as
the prepaid forward is not viewed as a sale or a constructive sale.").
161 IRC § 1011.
162 IRC § 1001.
163 See IRC § 1223 (setting forth no exception to the general rule for ordinary forward
contracts).
164 IRC § 1234A.
165 IRC § 1234A(1).
166 Straddles are arrangements in which the taxpayer enters into offsetting or nearly
offsetting financial positions in order to take advantage of what is sometimes called the
timing option. In a typical straddle the taxpayer might in Year 1 simultaneously sell a gold
future at $100 and purchase a gold future at the same price, each to be settled in Year 2.
Economically the positions are exactly offsetting and therefore the positions together have
no economic value. Prior to the end of Year 1 the positions are likely to have shifted in
value, however, and absent the special rules of § 1092 the taxpayer could sell the loss posi-
tion while retaining the gain position, thereby recognizing a tax, but not an economic, loss.
In addition, the taxpayer could preserve the deferral by entering into another offsetting
future contract with slightly different terms that matured the following year, thereby repli-
cating the loss. Section 1092 generally defers this loss to the extent of unrealized appreci-
ated gain in the other leg of the straddle.
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contracts,' 167 or as constructive sales of "appreciated financial posi-
tions" under § 1259;168 they also do not apply to arrangements de-
scribed in §§ 1258 or 1260, which target certain transactions designed
to convert ordinary income into capital gain.' 69
For a number of reasons, the taxation of forward contracts has long
been a subject of concern, and the increased use of such contracts in
recent years has lent added urgency to this concern.170 First, entry
into an ordinary forward contract where the seller actually owns the
underlying property is akin to a realization event, notwithstanding the
seller's continued ownership of the property until the settlement date.
As in a standard sale, the seller has transferred some of the burdens
and benefits of ownership to the buyer in exchange for the right to a
fixed amount on the settlement date. Despite the underlying eco-
nomic substance of the transaction, prior to the enactment of the pro-
visions mentioned above that set out special treatment for certain
forwards, no tax consequences attached to mere entry into a forward
contract; instead the realization rule applied. This treatment contin-
ues to obtain for forward contracts that do not fall within the ambit of
these sections.171 As a result, many forward contracts enable sellers to
167 Section 1256 contracts include regulated futures contracts, foreign currency con-
tracts, nonequity options, and certain other contracts. See IRC § 1256(b). If § 1256 ap-
plies, the contract generally is taxed annually on a mark-to-market basis, with gain or loss
allocated 40% to short-term and 60% to long-term capital gain and appropriate adjust-
ments made to basis to reflect the annual gains or losses recognized. IRC § 1256(a)(3).
168 Section 1259 provides for current recognition of gain to a seller in the case of the
constructive sale of certain appreciated financial positions. For this purpose a constructive
sale is a transaction in which the taxpayer retains legal or other indicia of title but elimi-
nates both the opportunity for gain and the risk of loss with respect to qualifying property.
IRC § 1259(c)(1). "Appreciated financial positions" include, with certain exceptions, posi-
tions with respect to stock, debt, or a partnership interest, that if sold or otherwise disposed
of on the constructive sale transaction date would generate gain to the seller. IRC
§ 1259(b)(7). They do not include positions subject to § 1256. IRC § 1259(b)(2)(c). Con-
structive sales include certain forward contracts. IRC § 1259(c)(1)(c).
169 Sections 1258 and 1260 recharacterize gains from certain transactions in which the
seller of a financial instrument realizes what is in form long-term capital gain but is in
substance income from the time value of money. Section 1258 applies to transactions in
which gain or loss on a future sale is locked in at the time the asset is purchased or where
the transaction is marketed as a capital-gain producing transaction; § 1260 applies to simi-
lar transactions in which the taxpayer purchases an interest in a pass-through entity in
order to obtain capital treatment on income earned by the pass-through that, if it were
earned by the taxpayer directly, would be ordinary. Under regulations yet to be issued,
ownership of certain debt instruments or non-pass-through entities such as a corporation
may be covered as well. See IRC § 1260(c)(1)(B).
170 See, e.g., Levy, Equal Tax Treatment, note 80, at 475 (noting that current debate
centers on, among other instruments, PPFs).
171 These provisions do not reach many forwards. Section 1092 only applies to forwards
if they are parts of straddles, IRC § 1092(c); most forwards are not parts of a straddle. A
forward falls within the mark-to-market regime of § 1256 only if it is a regulated futures or
dealer securities futures contract. See IRC § 1256(b) flush language. The other provisions
setting out special treatment are also narrow. The forward may fall outside of § 1258 be-
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defer gain, to transform interest income into capital gain, and to ex-
tend their holding periods in the underlying property. In the example
above, the $100 contract price typically reflects a premium on the fair
market value of ABC stock on Day 1 equal to an interest-like return
on that value over the term of the contract. This interest is not taken
into account, however, until Day 2 when received in exchange for the
ABC stock, and it is treated as part of the amount realized and taxed
at capital rates.
Second, some commentators argue that ordinary forward contracts
contain a loan element that goes unaccounted for in their tax treat-
ment.172 In Example 9, on Day 1 the purchaser, B, has received a
valuable right for which she need not make payment until Day 2. On
one view, A in effect has extended B credit equal to the purchase
price of the underlying property. Since, on this account, the forward
price should reflect an expected interest component arising from the
fact that payment need not be made until Day 2, the amount of the
implicit loan should be such that, when interest accrues at the prevail-
ing rate, the amount due at maturity is equal to the purchase price.
Finally, PPFs create tax issues not present in the ordinary forward
contract case because of the implicit loan running in the other direc-
tion-from buyer to seller. 173 If the contract price reflects the present
value of the purchased commodity on the transfer date, then under a
PPF the buyer in effect lends that amount to the seller, who pays in-
terest to the buyer while the contract is executory. On the exchange
date the seller constructively repays the principal and the buyer con-
structively pays both the interest and the principal to the seller in ex-
change for the property.
cause, for example, the purchaser's acquisition of the underlying property is not contempo-
raneous with the purchaser's entry into the forward to sell it or the forward does not
otherwise constitute an enumerated "conversion transaction." IRC § 1258(c). The for-
ward may fall outside of § 1259 because, for example, the property is not "appreciated,"
IRC § 1259(b), is not a "financial position," IRC § 1259(c), or the transaction eliminates
less than substantially all of the taxpayer's opportunity for gain and risk of loss, see H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 105-220, at 512-13, reprinted in 1997-4 C.B. (vol. 2) 1457, 1982-83 (describ-
ing a constructive sale as requiring the disposition of at least this quantum of benefits and
burdens). The forward may fall outside of § 1260 because, for example, it is not a transac-
tion in an interest in a pass-through entity. IRC § 1260(c)(1).
Deborah Schenk has proposed rules similar to those that apply to appreciated financial
positions under § 1259, except that a constructive sale would be defined more broadly to
include transactions in which the taxpayer eliminates risk of loss. Schenk, note 21, at 582-
86. A common means for a seller to eliminate the risk of loss is through purchase of a put
option. Nonrecourse financing is economically the equivalent of a put option. Id. at 623-
24.
172 See, e.g., Levy, Equal Tax Treatment, note 80, at 481-82. As argued below, the im-
plicit loan analysis fails to take account of the fact of the offsetting right of the
counterparty to retain the property sold until the delivery date.
173 See, e.g., id., at 502-06.
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The analyses of the realization rule and carve-outs in Sections II
and III suggest that the concerns about forwards are somewhat over-
stated. In fact, the problems that forward contracts create are two-
fold. First, they may convert what is economically an interest-like
return into deferred capital gain. Second, in the case of a PPF they
may disregard interest entirely. Concerns about untaxed interest in
ordinary forward contracts, however, seem misplaced.
Economically a forward contract is akin to the sale of a future inter-
est. The seller effectively carves out the portion of the value of the
underlying property attributable to all periods commencing on the
transfer date, retaining the balance. The retained portion is a wasting
asset, while the sold portion appreciates correspondingly. Applying
the carved-out interest analysis developed in Section III.A, the parties
would take account of the appreciation and depreciation to the extent
these amounts effectively are locked in, while the seller would treat
amounts received during the carve-out period as ordinary income.
Thus, consider again Example 9, in which A sells $100 of ABC stock
to B, with the $100 to be paid and the stock to be delivered two years
following the contract date. Assume that the stock is not expected to
change in value while the contract is executory, but that dividends on
average will yield returns comparable to those of other similar stocks,
or $10 annually. The analysis is exactly the same as that of the sale of
a future interest in Blackacre described in Example 4, except that in
Example 9 payment for the future interest occurs on the day the stock
changes hands, not on the carve-out date. The sole question is what
effect, if any, this difference has on the transaction.
The basic results in Example 4 were that on the carve-out date the
seller of the property recognized built-in gain or loss on the portion
sold and treated the retained property rights as a wasting asset that
generated ordinary income or loss during the carve-out term. The
purchaser simply accrued income on the future interest to reflect the
appreciation of that interest as the vesting date neared. Here the
seller receives a promise of cash rather than cash on the carve-out
date. As a result, the seller's net position on Day 1 is as follows: She
receives a right to $100 in two years, worth $82.64 on Day 1, and rec-
ognizes gain on the portion deemed sold. The right to payment on
Day 2 appreciates by $17.36 during the term of the carve-out. She
also has a wasting asset the fair market value of which is $17.36. If her
basis in this right equaled its fair market value, the deemed apprecia-
tion of the right to payment and the deemed depreciation in the pre-
sent interest would net to zero, and she would recognize $10 of
income annually during the carve-out period on dividends paid. In
other words, where the seller's basis equals the property's fair market
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value, one can safely disregard the effect of the passage of time on her
rights and obligations with respect to the retained interest.
Where, however, the seller's basis differs from the property's fair
market value, execution of the forward contract does have an effect
on the seller's income from the retained interest. 174 In that case the
amount of her deduction from the wasting present interest differs
from the amount of appreciation in the right to the cash payment on
Day 2. In Example 9 the seller would offset her $13.02 basis in the
wasting interest against the $17.36 appreciation, producing an addi-
tional $4.34 of ordinary income during the term of the carve-out,
based on the same constant yield-to-maturity principles that generally
apply to income and loss that accrue by reason of the passage of time.
Treatment of this $4.34 as ordinary rests on the same principles that
apply to the built-in gain on the remainder sale examined in Example
4.
One might argue that the seller under a forward contract incurs an
additional liability to deliver the underlying property that offsets her
income from the retained present interest. In the example this liabil-
ity has a value of $82.64 on Day 1 and increases to $100 on Day 2.
One can safely ignore this liability, however, as long as the seller re-
tains the underlying property during the carve-out period. The reason
is that the liability only arises if one views the future interest as not
actually disposed of on the sale date but only on the transfer date.
But on this assumption the seller continues to own property during
the carve-out that precisely offsets the liability. This property-the
future interest in the stock-is worth $82.64 on Day 1 and appreciates
on the same schedule that the liability to deliver the property
increases.
The treatment of the purchaser in the ordinary forward also differs
somewhat from the treatment of the purchaser in Example 4, where
payment occurred on the carve-out date. On Day 1 the position of the
purchaser under the ordinary forward contract consists of a right to
property worth $100 on Day 2, together with an offsetting obligation
to deliver $100 on Day 2. The obligation under the forward contract
to deliver $100 on Day 2 must be taken into account because it is not
possible to earmark the property that will be used to satisfy the liabil-
ity-if it were, then the contract in effect would be prepaid. One
could restate the point by observing that there can be no carve-out of
cash in a non-PPF because cash is fungible. For this reason, the pur-
chaser, unlike the seller, will not accrue income during the carve-out
174 The seller, however, should recognize income or loss on the portion deemed sold on
the carve-out date regardless of whether she is paid on that date or when the property
physically changes hands.
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by reason of the carve-out itself, because her obligation to deliver cash
offsets her right to receive property. Instead, she neither includes nor
deducts income between Days 1 and 2. As a practical matter, how-
ever, the purchaser will have offsetting income arising from the reten-
tion of cash that will earn interest and be used to satisfy the
obligation.
A PPF, of course, is no different from the sale of the future interest
described in Example 4:
Example 9A: On Day 1, when the fair market value of 100
shares of ABC stock on Day 1 is $100, B pays $82.64 to A in
exchange for the right to receive on Day 2, two years hence,
100 shares of ABC stock from A. A's adjusted basis in the
ABC stock on Day 1 is $75.
The only difference between Example 9 and Example 9A is that in the
PPF B makes the payment up front, just as in the case of a current sale
of a future interest. On these facts, it is appropriate to assign income
to B between Days 1 and 2 based on the appreciation of her right to
the 100 shares of stock, just as in Example 4, because she has no off-
setting obligation to deliver cash in the future. This income is in a
sense offset, however, by the fact that B pays only the discounted
value of the 100 shares, or $82.64, on Day 1, rather than the $100 on
Day 2. B thus has $17.36 of income that accrues on a constant yield-
to-maturity basis between Days 1 and 2.
Additional questions arise in two areas. The first is where the con-
tract is or may be cash-settled. As the preceding discussion demon-
strates, application of the carve-out rules depends on the seller's
ownership and subsequent transfer of the underlying property; these
features of the transaction justify its treatment as a sale of property on
the date the parties enter into the contract. Where the contract is
cash-settled, the analysis is less clear. There are two basic cases. In
the first the seller at no point owns the underlying property. In that
case the underlying property serves merely as a measure of the obliga-
tions of the parties to the contract, 175 and the only possible bases for
preserving realization-based treatment through application of carve-
out principles are to preserve continuity and consistency, or because
valuation and liquidity problems make another regime inappropriate.
In the second case the seller owns the property during some or all of
the carve-out period. The question is whether this ownership should
matter when the property will not be transferred under the contract.
As explained in greater detail in the next Subsection, the better ap-
175 See Kleinbard, Risky and Riskless, note 52, at 794-95.
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proach is to apply a modified version of the carve-out rules when and
to the extent the transaction is "covered"-when, that is, the nominal
seller (here A) owns some or all of the subject property. The reason is
that entry into the forward contract permits the holder of the property
to cash out gain or loss.
Example 9B: A and B enter into the same contract as in
Example 9, except that they agree to substitute a cash pay-
ment on Day 2 for transfer of the ABC stock. If the stock is
worth less than $100 on Day 2, B will pay A the difference
between $100 and the stock's fair market value, and if the
stock is worth more than $100, A will pay B the difference
between the stock's fair market value and $100. At all times
between Days 1 and 2, A owns the ABC stock, and her basis
is $75.
In Example 9B, A cashes out her gain or loss on 82.64% of the ABC
stock by entering into the contract. No matter what the price path of
the stock after Day 1, she has realized her built-in gain with respect to
this portion. Because she has locked in this gain, it is appropriate to
treat it as realized on the transaction date, even though she does not
dispose of the underlying property. At the same time, because her
obligations under the contract are personal, it is also appropriate to
treat her as continuing to own the stock for tax purposes. In effect,
the transaction is a constructive sale and repurchase of the 82.64%
deemed sold,176 or a wash sale.177 Where the effect of the sale is to
manufacture a loss, the loss could be deferred under the same princi-
ples that apply to ordinary wash sales. 178 Assuming gain is recog-
nized, A would simply increase her basis by the amount of the
inclusion. A's ownership of the stock should not affect treatment of
the purchaser.
The other area in which questions arise is where the contract pro-
vides for physical settlement but the seller is not in possession of the
underlying property for some period of time between Day 1 and
Day 2. When the seller does not own the property on the transaction
date, her obligations under the contract should be treated as though
the contract were cash-settled until she acquires the property (or
rights to it). When the property is acquired, gain or loss should be
recognized based on the difference between the price paid for the por-
176 Deemed transactions of this sort are not uncommon in the Code. See, e.g., IRC
§ 338(a) (deemed sale and repurchase of stock in certain "qualified stock purchases").
177 Wash sales are sales closely preceded or followed by purchases of the same or identi-
cal property. See IRC § 1091 (deferring loss on wash sales of stock and securities).
178 See id.
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tion deemed sold on the transaction date and the amount the seller
pays for it. If, for example, the seller pays $125 for the underlying
property, she should recognize a loss on the carve-out of $20.66. In
addition, the excess basis allocable to the retained interest should be
available either as a carryback or as a loss to current income.
179
B. Contingent-Payment Debt Instruments
The second financial product examined here is a CDI, which typi-
cally provides for some combination of fixed and contingent pay-
ments, the latter often keyed to the performance of a reference index,
such as the S&P 500. In some instances all of the payments on the
instrument are in principle contingent.
Example 10:180 On December 31 of Year 1, X Co. issues for
$1 million a debt instrument that matures on December 31 of
Year 11. The instrument provides for annual payments of
interest, beginning in Year 2, at the rate of 6% and for a
payment at maturity equal to $1 million plus the excess, if
any, of the price of 10,000 shares of publicly traded stock in
an unrelated corporation over $350,000, or less the excess, if
any, of $350,000 over the price of 10,000 shares of the stock
on the maturity date. On the issue date, the forward price to
purchase 10,000 shares of the stock on December 31 of Year
11 is $350,000.
Under current rules, this and similar CDIs are taxed under the non-
contingent bond method. 181 This method requires the issuer to con-
struct a comparable noncontingent debt instrument on which
payments are deemed to accrue irrespective of whether payment
amounts are fixed or determinable at the time of issuance of the
CDI.182 To the extent that actual payments on the CDI differ from
projected payments, the parties adjust their previously taken interest
inclusions and deductions; these adjustments likewise are treated as
interest income and interest expense. For example, the regulations
provide that the issuer of the debt instrument in Example 10 computes
the comparable yield of the noncontingent payment debt instrument
179 In the example, the amount paid for the retained interest would be 125% of $17.36,
or $21.69. The $4.33 excess should be available as an ordinary loss either carried back to
the carve-out years or applied against current (or future) ordinary income.
180 This example is based on Reg. § 1.1275-4(b)(4)(vi)(Ex. 1).
181 Reg. § 1.1275-4(b).
182 The comparable yield is generally "the yield at which the issuer would issue a fixed
rate debt instrument with terms and conditions similar to those of the contingent payment
debt instrument." Reg. § 1.1275-4(b)(4)(i)(A).
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by determining the cost of a hedge on the actual CDI. The hedge in
this case is the forward purchase of 10,000 shares of the stock on the
maturity date. Since this cost is $350,000, the cost of the comparable
instrument is $1 million ($650,000 fixed amount due plus cost of
hedge), and the instrument has a yield of 6%. Since the instrument
actually pays 6% annually, the parties do not include any deemed in-
terest as OLD. (If the forward price of the stock differed from
$350,000, the comparable yield would be higher or lower because the
issuer would pay more or less to construct a comparable noncontin-
gent bond, in which case there could be annual OID or bond pre-
mium.) Where, unlike the instrument in Example 10, the contingency
is not based on market information, the yield generally is presumed to
be the applicable federal rate.183
The current treatment of CDIs is the product of a long and some-
what tortuous evolution. Under rules proposed in 1986, no part of the
issue price of a CDI was allocated to its contingent portion.R4 Thus, a
debt instrument issued at par that provided for an additional contin-
gent payment at maturity was treated as a fixed-rate debt instrument
with no OID, together with a contingent payment valued at zero, even
if no stated interest were payable during the term of the instrument.
Because such an instrument economically has OID, the effect was
deferral of tax on the holder and concomitant deferral of the interest
deduction to the issuer.185
In response to this problem, Treasury issued proposed regulations
in 1991 that adopted a bifurcation approach to CDIs.186 Where the
CDI contained a fixed portion and a contingent portion the value of
which was based on that of certain publicly-traded property (and the
fixed payment at maturity at least equaled the issue price), the issuer
was required to allocate the issue price between the fixed and contin-
gent portions based on their relative fair market values. The fixed
piece was taxed as debt with an OID component, and the contingent
piece was taxed according to its economic substance, typically as some
combination of options and forward contracts.
Although this regime represented a significant improvement over
prior law, it came under heavy criticism.1 87 First, the tax treatment of
183 Reg. § 1275-4(b)(4)(i)(B). In certain circumstances the issuer may be able to over-
come this presumption and apply a higher yield. See id.184 Prop. Reg. § 1.1275-4(e), (f), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,022, 12,087-12,090 (Apr. 8, 1986).
185 See Reed H. Shuldiner, Consistency and the Taxation of Financial Products, 70 Taxes
781, 787-88 (1992) [hereinafter Consistency].
186 Prop. Reg. § 1.1275-4(g), 56 Fed. Reg. 8,308, 8,310 (Feb. 28, 1991).
187 See, e.g., David P. Hariton, New Rules Bifurcating Contingent Debt-A Mistake?,
51 Tax Notes 235 (Apr. 15, 1991); ABA Tax Sec., Report on Amendments to Proposed
Regulation Section 1.1275-4; Proposed Regulations Regarding Certain Contingent Debt
Instruments Under the Original Issue Discount Rules, reprinted in 53 Tax Notes 1187
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the components into which the instrument was disaggregated was it-
self often uncertain. As an example, a payment based on the spread
between a floating rate and a fixed rate times a notional amount might
be marked to market under Section 1256 if it were a separate instru-
ment, but it was not clear that this rule should apply to a component
of the CDI. Second, the economic equivalence posited between the
instrument and its components, if separately purchased, was only ap-
proximate because the components would have value deriving from
the fact that they were separately tradable whereas the CDI typically
was unitary; moreover the value of the instrument also could be
greater or less than the values of its parts taken together if different
tax rules (such as mark to market) applied to the components when
separate than when embedded. Third, the basic theory of the rules
that no portion of the contingent piece could be treated as debt
seemed not to accord with economic reality.
These and other criticisms led, in 1994, to the withdrawal of the
1991 proposed regulations and the issuance of proposed regulations
applying the current noncontingent bond method; the 1994 regula-
tions were finalized in 1996.188 As described above, they set out a
quasi-integration scheme that in effect presumes that all amounts pay-
able under the instrument other than principal are interest. This pre-
sumption generally carries over to dispositions of CDIs, gain on which
is treated as interest income, and loss on which is generally treated as
ordinary to the extent of previously accrued net interest inclusions.
189
The advantages of the final approach are thought to consist in its rela-
tive simplicity and administrability. 190 Rather than attempt to decom-
pose a CDI into its constituent elements, the rules disregard the
specific character of the various elements that make up the instrument
and instead look to the basic expected cash flow. This method avoids
the problems of indeterminate bifurcations, of treating what is eco-
nomically interest as something else because there is a remote chance
of nonpayment, and of complex computations for a variety of differ-
ent composite elements.
Notwithstanding these advantages, there is substantial question
whether the current rules represent a real advance over the bifurca-
tion approach of the 1991 rules. The criticisms offered of the latter
(Dec. 9, 1991). But see Lawrence Lokken, New Rules Bifurcating Contingent Debt-A
Good Start, 51 Tax Notes 495 (Apr. 29, 1991) (criticizing aspects of the 1991 proposed
regulations but generally supporting their bifurcation approach).
188 See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 59 Fed. Reg. 62,884 (Dec. 16, 1994) (withdraw-
ing 1986 and 1991 proposed regulations and issuing new proposed regulations); Treas. Dec.
8674, 1996-2 C.B. 84 (June 14, 1996) (final regulations).
189 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-4(b)(8).
190 See, e.g., Kau, note 25, at 1007.
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are only partly justified as a critique of bifurcation generally. As Law-
rence Lokken and David Weisbach have separately noted, bifurcation
is in principle desirable for CDIs, despite its rather artless execution in
the 1991 proposed regulations. 191 The reasons are twofold. First, bi-
furcation has the potential for substantially greater accuracy than inte-
gration as long as the tax law distinguishes among the fundamental
units that a CDI can comprise. 192 If the treatment of these units is
well established and the bifurcation method provides unambiguous
disaggregation rules, then each kind of investment will be taxed the
same, whether it stands alone or is embedded in another instrument.
The integration approach of the current regulations does not observe
this consistency principle. Whichever view the tax law ultimately
takes about the proper treatment of such instruments as forwards and
futures on one hand and CDIs on the other, at least one of these in-
struments is taxed incorrectly under current law.
Second, and as a corollary to the first criticism, bifurcation substan-
tially undercuts arbitrage opportunities that arise where the composite
is treated differently from economically similar or identical compo-
nents that are themselves publicly traded. As an example, the current
regulations attempt to accrue interest on an option or forward con-
tract embedded in a CDI, but the interest components of these instru-
ments when held separately often goes untaxed. 193 This inconsistency
permits a taxpayer who purchases a CDI and enters into offsetting
forwards or options to achieve an after-tax benefit with zero pretax
investment (other than transaction costs). A properly applied bifurca-
tion approach would not permit this arbitrage opportunity.
Furthermore, the complaint that the economic equivalence between
the embedded instruments in a CDI and separate options and for-
wards is only approximate ought not provoke concern given that the
regime that ultimately prevailed contains substantially greater inaccu-
racies. Integrating the embedded financial instrument into the debt
piece of the CDI completely ignores the different treatment of the
financial instruments when issued separately. If the tax law generally
is going to respect differences between these financial instruments and
debt, then a regime that collapses the two for CDIs is substantially
more inaccurate than one that merely disregards the differences be-
tween a nonseverable option or forward embedded in a CDI and one
191 Lokken, note 187, at 497 ("In concept, the bifurcation rules are sound."); Weisbach,
Tax Responses, note 6, at 511-26 (arguing that "[b]ifurcation ... initially seems to be the
best method of taxing hybrid instruments").
192 See Weisbach, Tax Responses, note 6, at 513 (noting that rules must specify how
complex instruments are bifurcated in order to avoid the problem of multiple and inconsis-
tent bifurcations).
193 The enactment of § 1259 went some way toward lessening this discontinuity.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 57:TAX LAW REVIEW
HeinOnline  -- 57 Tax L. Rev. 462 2003-2004
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
that is separately issued and tradable. Moreover, there is little evi-
dence to suggest that the separate tradability of the components has a
significant impact on value.
194
Although the proposal offered here represents a return to the gen-
eral bifurcation approach that the 1991 regulations adopted, it also
embodies the elements of a desirable bifurcation regime as described
by Weisbach and Lokken. Because it identifies and taxes the debt
portion of all financial instruments while providing for wait-and-see
taxation only where either the taxpayer assumes an investment risk or
administrative or similar considerations support the wait-and-see ap-
proach, it respects the line the tax law has long drawn between returns
on equity and other kinds of returns. In this sense it gets the "right"
answer on taxation of the constituent elements of CDIs, assuming the
tax law continues to apply different rules to debt and equity. The pro-
posal also largely eliminates the inconsistency between the taxation of
CDIs and their component instruments-a signal difficulty of the cur-
rent CDI rules and one not resolved under the earlier bifurcation
scheme. Finally, it eliminates discontinuities in the treatment of simi-
lar composite financial instruments, such as NPCs and CDIs, again
because of the similar disaggregation scheme that applies. From an
economic perspective, these instruments differ from each other prima-
rily in two ways, neither of which affects the application of the rules
proposed here. Currently, the CDI rules apply to certain publicly-
traded debt instruments, whereas the NPC rules apply more broadly
to instruments such as an equity swap. In addition, NPCs more typi-
cally involve the possibility of net periodic payments traveling in ei-
ther direction while the instrument is outstanding. In this respect they
do not produce "interest" under its accepted tax definition of payment
for the use or forbearance of money;195 rather they more typically re-
present either a risk management tool or a wager.
196
It is not necessary to work through a sample CDI in detail in order
to see how the proposal achieves these results. Consider again the
instrument described in Example 10, a CDI with fixed annual interest
payments of $60,000 for 10 years and a contingent payment of $1 mil-
lion, either plus the excess of the value of 10,000 shares of certain
publicly-traded stock (the stock value) over $350,000, or less the ex-
cess of $350,000 over the stock value, at maturity. Economically, this
instrument consists of a fixed-rate loan together with a cash-settled
194 See Weisbach, Tax Responses, note 6, at 521 ("There is no evidence that bundling
instruments into a single security significantly changes their economics.").
195 See Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 498 (1940).
196 See Weisbach, Tax Responses, note 6 at 498 ("A prepaid forward looks much like a
contingent payment debt instrument except that the amount guaranteed to be returned is
not sufficient for the instrument to be classified as debt for tax purposes.").
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PPF of $350,000 for the stock. Under the carve-out approach, the par-
ties would allocate the $1 million principal amount to each of these
components. Interest would accrue on both of the constituent instru-
ments. The loan of course is a fixed-rate debt instrument. The PPF
has an interest-like component as well. Under the proposal outlined
here, it would be taxed under either realization principles applying
expected value taxation akin to those in Example 9A, or some other
regime that requires current accrual of interest and expense. Since
the instrument is cash-settled, there is no investment risk in the refer-
ence stock associated with the issuance of the CDI. Congress there-
fore would be free to adopt either realization-type principles or a
mark-to-market or other non-realization-based regime for taxing such
a PPF, without running afoul of the realization principle.
Congress nevertheless might have good reason to adopt at least the
timing principles of realization-based taxation for such a CDI. The
reason is that CDIs often will not be cash-settled. If realization-based
taxation applies to physically-settled but not cash-settled CDIs, then
the tax law draws a line between instruments that differ only in the
medium of payment. If an issuer or holder is largely indifferent be-
tween them, there is apt to be tax gamesmanship at the margin.
As an example, consider the economically equivalent non-cash-set-
tled version of the instrument in Example 10. It would provide for a
guaranteed payment of $650,000 cash plus 10,000 shares of the refer-
ence stock on the maturity date; this set of rights is identical to that
provided in the example, except that the holder ends up with stock
and less cash. More generally, CDIs often are convertible into equity
of the issuer or a related party, or are exchangeable into equity of an
unrelated party. Such a convertible or exchangeable instrument eco-
nomically constitutes a CDI together with one or more physically-set-
tled options or PPFs.
Example 11: XYZ Co. issues an instrument for $1 million
providing for annual interest payments of $40,000 for 10
years and $1 million on maturity. In addition, the holder has
the right to forgo the repayment of the principal amount on
maturity in exchange for 1,000 shares of ABC Co. stock;
ABC is not related to XYZ for tax purposes.197 On the issue
197 Such instruments have long been treated as non-CDIs when convertible into stock of
the issuer or a related party. See Reg. § 1.1275-4(a)(4). I follow customary usage and refer
to such instruments as "convertibles" and to instruments that can be exchanged for equity
of an unrelated party as "exchangeables." The exclusion of convertibles from the CDI
rules is widely recognized as exceptional. See, e.g., Dana L. Trier & Lucy W. Farr, Rev.
Rul. 2002-31 and the Taxation of Contingent Convertibles, pt. 2, 96 Tax Notes 105, 105
(July 1, 2002) (noting the "nonneutrality that results from a special treatment of con-
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date, an option to purchase 1,000 shares of ABC stock for $1
million on the maturity date costs $100,000.
Though structured as a fixed-rate debt instrument combined with an
exchange right, in economic substance the instrument in Example 11 is
equivalent to two instruments: a fixed-rate debt instrument issued for
$900,000 paying $40,000 annual interest and $1 million at maturity,
and an option to purchase 1,000 shares of ABC stock on the maturity
date for $1 million. Because the straight debt portion is worth
$900,000 but pays $1 million at maturity, it has $100,000 of OID. The
second piece is a physically-settled option the tax analysis of which
follows that of the basic option described in Section III.B.
Consider now the same instrument, except that instead of the ex-
change right, the instrument provides for $1 million at maturity plus
any excess of the value of 1,000 shares of ABC stock over $1 million
on that date. Economically the cash-only version of the instrument is
the same as the one with the exchange feature; only the manner of
payment differs. The question is what impact providing nonrealiza-
tion timing or character rules to this variation has, given that realiza-
tion taxation, as set out in Sections II and II in the case of carve-out
transactions, should apply to the instrument that has the exchange fea-
ture. The difference could be substantial irrespective of whether the
capital gain or loss inherent in the underlying asset was taxed during
the pendency of the option under the Black-Scholes approach. In par-
ticular, if it was taxed, there would be a combination of interest ex-
pense and short-term capital gain or loss that would accrue on the
physically-settled option under the dynamic hedging model described
above. In general as an option increases in value (or more generally
the option delta approaches one) the amount of deemed interest paid
under the dynamic hedging model increases. This increase reflects the
holder's use of added borrowing to finance the purchase forward of
increasing portions of the underlying asset. At the same time, the
holder of such an option would have associated short-term capital
gain as the value of the underlying asset that is deemed owned in-
creased. If cash-settled options were treated as generating ordinary
income and expense exclusively, then a taxpayer could enter into op-
posed positions, one cash-settled and one physically settled, the result
of which was a zero net economic investment but that generated net
short-term capital gain or loss. If cash-settled options were treated as
vertibles that differs radically from that applicable to other hybrid debt instruments"); see
also David P. Hariton, Conventional and Contingent Convertibles: Double or Nothing, 96
Tax Notes 123, 123 n.3 (July 1, 2002) (quoting discussion of other commentators regarding
the historical basis for the exceptional treatment of convertibles), 123-24 (describing excep-
tional treatment of convertibles).
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generating short-term capital gain or loss, or if a basketing regime ap-
plied to them, this problem would be avoided.
If capital gain or loss was not taxed during the pendency of the op-
tion under the Black-Scholes model, then the disparity in treatment
that results from different timing rules still would create an arbitrage
opportunity. Consider again a taxpayer that enters into offsetting op-
tions, one physically settled and the other cash-settled. Although
elective character treatment is not available, the taxpayer might be
able to generate a net interest expense or other ordinary loss without
an associated economic loss. Consistent use of realization rules would
be one way (though not the only way) to avoid this result.
V. CONSISTENCY AND CONTINUITY IN THE TAXATION OF
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
In the preceding Section, I showed how adoption of the principles
identified and explained in Sections II and III could simplify the taxa-
tion of financial instruments and reduce opportunities for arbitrage
and deadweight loss in the tax system. In concluding this discussion, it
is helpful to situate the proposal within the more general framework
that commentators often have used to analyze the taxation of financial
instruments.
Earlier, I indicated that the two areas in which room for improve-
ment is greatest are consistency-treating formally different but eco-
nomically identical instruments the same-and continuity-treating
economically similar instruments similarly. 198 The distinction between
continuity and consistency roughly maps onto that between hybridiza-
tion and synthesis, two additional concepts that have received sub-
stantial attention in the literature on financial instrument taxation.199
Hybridization is the construction of an asset, such as a CDI, that has
features of two or more other assets that enjoy distinct tax treatments
but is not reducible to either. Synthesis is the replication of returns of
one type of instrument by holding two or more positions or assets that
individually differ from the instrument but together exactly mimic it;
an example would be a share of non-dividend-paying stock composed
of the purchase of a zero coupon bond and a call option on the share,
and the sale of a put option on it.
The issues that hybrids and synthetics raise are conceptually dis-
tinct, at least at a level of specificity relevant to incremental tax re-
198 See text accompanying notes 6-11.
199 See, e.g., Strnad, note 7; Weisbach, Tax Responses, note 6.
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form.200 At the most general level, hybrids pose the problem of
determining the tax treatment of an instrument that is similar to two
(or more) differently-taxed instruments but is not reducible to either.
As noted above, the tax law typically has adopted an analogical, or
"cubbyhole," approach to this problem under which the instrument is
taxed like the one to which it is most "similar," though the law also
has applied bifurcation or integration on occasion. 201 Examples of the
analogical approach include the classification of corporate obligations
as debt or equity, but not both,20 2 and the taxation of a debt instru-
ment with variable returns as a CDI or a variable debt instrument, but
not both.20 3 Examples of bifurcation include the now-withdrawn 1991
proposed CDI rules, which disaggregated such instruments into fixed
and contingent components,20 4 and the rules that cover NPCs with
certain "significant" up-front payments, which are treated separately
from the NPC proper as loans.20 5 Examples of integration include the
current CDI rules20 6 and the proposed NPC regulations covering sig-
nificant nonperiodic swap payments.20 7
Synthetics present the distinct problem of taxing two or more re-
lated, often offsetting positions held by the same taxpayer, such as the
combination of a long and a short position in the same or closely re-
lated commodities, or the purchase of a series of zero coupon bonds
maturing in a manner that mimics the maturity on a single bond bear-
ing ordinary coupons. 20 8 When the taxpayer holds a synthetic, the
combined characteristics of the instruments of which it is composed
will mimic those of another instrument that enjoys distinct tax treat-
200 See Weisbach, Tax Responses, note 6, at 525-26 (arguing that the issues remain dis-
tinct only as long as different generic economic returns remain subject to different tax
treatments).
201 1 use the term "bifurcation" to apply to decompositions generally, irrespective of
whether the division is into two, or more than two, basic assets or types of return. Under
integration, all of the returns from the instrument are combined and subject to tax on the
same basis irrespective of their economic "substance" as fixed or contingent, or "capital"
or "ordinary." See generally Kau, 25, at 1005-1007; Weisbach, Tax Responses, note 6, at
492-94 (both discussing differences between bifurcation and integration).
202 See IRC § 385(a). Interests historically have been, and currently are, classified as
either debt or equity, but not as both, even though current law technically authorizes bifur-
cation in some cases. See id; see also § 385(b) (listing factors according to which a debtor-
creditor or a corporation-shareholder interest is deemed to exist); see also Rev. Rul. 83-98,
1983-2 C.B. 40 (classifying certain "adjustable rate convertible notes" that concededly con-
tain both debt and equity features as equity, rather than as part debt and part equity).
203 See Reg. §§ 1.1275-4 (CDIs), -5 (variable rate debt instruments).
204 See text accompanying note 186.
205 See Reg. §§ 1.446-3(f)(2)(iii)(B); 1.446-3(g)(4). But see Prop. Reg. § 1.446-3(g)(6)
(applying integration method akin to that for CDIs to "significant nonperiodic payments"
expected to be received under an NPC).
206 Reg. § 1.1275-4.
207 Prop. Reg. § 1.446-3(g).
208 See Weisbach, Tax Responses, note 6, at 526.
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ment. If the tax law respects the separate status of the instruments,
there is a mis-match between the economics of the combined position
and their tax treatment. Where the tax law specifically has addressed
synthetics, it generally either has integrated the component parts into
a single instrument, or, more commonly, has adopted a "partial inte-
,gration regime" that denies or defers the tax benefits resulting from
ownership of the separate but related positions. 209 Partial integration
provisions include the deferral of losses on certain related-party
sales,210 straddles211 and wash sales. 212 Full integration rules include
those applicable to certain foreign currency 213 and debt hedges, as
well as the already described rules for CDIs. 214 More generally, the
step transaction, sham transaction, or economic substance doctrines
may apply to combine nominally distinct assets or positions into a sin-
gle position, in effect a form of equitable integration. The tax law also
may disregard or collapse circular cash flows or other arrangements
that have no economic effect. 21 5
Recently, advocates for reform have argued that the tax law should
use integration as a method to solve the problems of both hybrids and
synthetics, principally on the grounds of simplicity and adminis-
trability. 216 The carve-out treatment proposed here, however, repre-
sents a form of bifurcation. It disaggregates assets into equity and
nonequity positions to which rules for wait-and-see and accrual taxa-
tion, respectively, then are applied. As others have argued, however,
once one recognizes that hybridization and synthesis represent distinct
problems, it becomes questionable whether a single approach-inte-
209 The phrase is Weisbach's. See id.
210 IRC § 267. As Shuldiner has observed, the effect of § 267 is to treat the related
parties as a single party, so that the sale and purchase are collapsed and no transaction is
deemed to have occurred for income tax purposes. Shuldiner, Consistency, note 185, at
786.
211 IRC § 1092.
212 See IRC § 1091.
213 Reg. § 1.988-5.
214 Reg. § 1.1275-6.
215 See, e.g., Reg. § 1.338(h)(10)-1 (providing that circular cash flow on certain qualified
stock purchases may be disregarded for tax purposes). The kinds of rules applicable to
synthetics as opposed to hybrids provides further evidence that they present distinct
problems. Synthetics generally present a problem of tax avoidance; it therefore is not sur-
prising that equitable tax doctrines, such as the economic substance and step transaction
rules, are among the primary tools at the government's disposal to deal with them. Hy-
brids also may present tax avoidance problems, but if they do, it typically is because of the
disparity between compliance with technical tax rules and the economic result that should
obtain. More commonly, hybrids present the distinct problem discussed above of classifi-
cation of an instrument the returns on which are mixed.
216 Advocates include Kau, note 25, at 1007, and Edward Kleinbard, Beyond Good and
Evil Debt (and Debt Hedges): A Cost of Capital Allowance System, 67 Taxes 943 (1989).
See Weisbach, Tax Responses, note 6, at 492-94, for a description of integration and a
summary of criticisms of it.
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gration or bifurcation-can resolve them. In particular, the advan-
tages that bifurcation offers for the treatment of hybrids as contrasted
with synthetics have been well documented by David Weisbach. 217 As
long as the tax law provides an unambiguous "spanning set," or set of
fundamental constituents into which complex instruments are disag-
gregated, bifurcation substantially reduces or eliminates uncertainty
and tax planning opportunities that hybrid financial products create,
because it applies the same set of rules to a given type of return, irre-
spective of whether the return is embedded in a larger instrument, or
instead stands alone. The analysis of financial instruments presented
in Sections III and IV demonstrates some of these advantages.
Bifurcation generally is thought to be less helpful, however, for
dealing with synthetics, because they do not present the problem of
classifying new instruments (though they may involve such instru-
ments), but of determining when nominally distinct instruments "off-
set" each other in a way that should preclude respecting their separate
status.218 Because it is always possible to combine elements of the
spanning set to achieve a result that mimics another instrument, the
articulation and application of a spanning set by itself does not solve
the problem of synthetics. Therefore, as long as the tax law does not
provide either a set of rules for integration, or some other method of
denying or deferring the tax benefits from entry into offsetting posi-
tions, synthetics will continue to pose problems even if applicable bi-
furcation rules are unambiguous and comprehensive. Consider the
following example:
Example 12: Assume that the spanning set includes, among
other elements, straight debt, options, and equity. Individual
A owns one share of appreciated XYZ stock, which does not
pay dividends. On Day 1, A, wishing to realize the gain in
her share but to defer tax, purchases a put on the stock exer-
cisable on Day 2, one year hence, writes a call on the stock
with the same strike price and strike date as the put, and
issues a zero coupon bond that will mature on Day 2 at the
strike price.
Under the put-call parity theorem A has entered into a position that is
economically identical to a sale of the XYZ stock on Day 1.219 In the
absence of special rules, her treatment differs from what it would be
had she sold the stock. On Day 1, A would receive the present value
of the share of XYZ stock without recognizing gain. She also would
217 Weisbach, Tax Responses, note 6, at 509-11.
218 Id. at 493-94.
219 See text accompanying notes 153-56.
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be entitled to interest deductions on the zero coupon bond between
Days 1 and 2. On the strike date either she would exercise the put or
the counterparty would exercise the call, triggering gain recognition.
The sale proceeds will offset exactly the amount due on the zero cou-
pon bond.
Under current law, this set of transactions might be subject to tax as
though it were a sale of the stock on Day 1, but that outcome is not
certain. Although § 1259 treats the constructive sale of certain appre-
ciated financial positions as current dispositions subject to tax when
entered into, this provision, which is an integration rule combining the
present agreement to sell with the subsequent disposition of the sub-
ject property, is relatively narrow and likely would not apply to the
transactions described in Example 12 because there is no formal
sale.220 Even if it did apply, A could circumvent it if she were willing
to retain an amount of upside potential or downside risk with respect
to the stock such that she did not dispose of "substantially all" of the
benefits and burdens of owning it.221 In that case, she could lock in a
portion of the gain, indeed most of it, without current tax. Although
there is some authority outside of § 1259 supporting the treatment of
the purchase of the put and sale of the call as a forward sale, it is
relatively easy to circumvent this result by having the strike price of
the put be somewhat lower than that of the call, or having the strike
dates differ somewhat. 222 More generally, where a special rule identi-
220 See IRC § 1259(c)(1)(A)-(D) (including a forward contract, but not including the
sale of a call and purchase of a put, among the transactions qualifying as constructive sales
apart from further specification in regulations), (d)(1) (defining a forward contract subject
to the constructive sales rules as a contract to deliver a substantially fixed amount of prop-
erty for a substantially fixed price). Although § 1259(c)(1)(E) provides authority for regu-
lations pursuant to which transactions "that have substantially the same effect as," among
other transactions, a forward contract are treated as constructive sales, no regulations have
been promulgated to date. The Commissioner also has general authority to apply step-
transaction principles to combine formally distinct steps, the intent and effect of which are
to achieve the same result that would obtain if the transaction were accomplished in a
single step. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1939).
221 See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-220, note 171, at 514 (providing that regulations are
expected to treat certain "collars," in which the seller retains some risk of loss and oppor-
tunity for gain, as constructive sales for purposes of § 1259 if "substantially all" of the risk
of loss and opportunity for gain are disposed of). Note that § 1259 also would not apply if
the transaction did not involve the constructive disposition of a position that was both
"appreciated" and a "financial position." Suppose, for example, that A was in a loss posi-
tion with respect to the stock and that A wanted to generate current ordinary losses to
offset other ordinary income. The transaction would not fall within the constructive sales
rules because the position would not be appreciated. Nor would these rules apply if the
asset sold were not a financial position but, instead, some other kind of asset, such as real
estate.
222 Compare Rev. Rul. 72-543, 1972-2 C.B. 87 (put and call arrangement between nomi-
nal purchaser-lessor and nominal seller-lessee transferred all benefits and burdens to latter,
who was deemed owner), and Progressive Corp v. United States, 970 F.2d 188 (6th Cir.
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fying offsetting positions does not apply, taxpayers can achieve de-
sired tax results without associated economic investment through the
use of synthetic instruments.
As these remarks suggest, reaching solutions to the different
problems that hybrids and synthetics pose requires more than one ap-
proach, at least within a framework that accords different treatments
to different kinds of returns. Hybrids create arbitrage opportunities
and business costs because of the uncertainty of their classification,
the possibility of multiple and conflicting decompositions to which a
single instrument or similar instruments may be subject, and the mis-
taxation of hybrid returns when they are taxed under the cubbyhole
approach. As argued here and by others, bifurcation, if properly ap-
plied, offers a reasonably good solution to these problems.223 Synthet-
ics, by contrast, create difficulties because of the fact that nominally
distinct assets, even if their tax treatment is settled, can offset each
other to produce what is in substance another asset, subject to differ-
ent tax rules. The challenge they pose to the tax law is that of prop-
erly identifying when and how positions should be integrated, whether
or not they are elements of the spanning set. For example, detailed
rules, such as those of § 1259, can be circumvented relatively easily,
while generic standards may create substantial tax costs and deter eco-
nomically beneficial transactions through uncertainty.224
The bifurcation regime developed in this Article thus has primary
application to hybrids. It represents a method for decomposing a
wide array of assets into elements of a small spanning set. The attrac-
tiveness of the set derives from its parsimony and from the fact that it
respects arguably the most basic lines the tax law has drawn in its
treatment of the kinds of returns that various investments may
generate.
Nevertheless, this regime also goes some way to solving problems
that synthetics pose. The primary reason is that by its nature the cub-
byhole system that the bifurcation regime would replace offers arbi-
trage opportunities akin to those that synthetics provide. The
arbitrage opportunities result from the fact that the cubbyhole system
in effect creates synthetics: By treating composite instruments as
1992) (ownership of asset together with put option precluded taking of dividends received
deduction, as did ownership of stock together with sale of deep-in-the-money call option),
with Penn-Dixie Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 837 (1978) (no substantial exercise of
put or call where strike dates differed and price of underlying property was volatile).
223 See note 6.
224 These costs include not only those of entering into transactions that are economically
inefficient, see Weisbach, Line Drawing, note 9, at 1629 (noting "significant" transaction
costs to many tax-motivated transactions) but also those of good-faith efforts to comply
with the law. See David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 860,
871 (1999) (discussing transaction costs of drafting and complying with complex rules).
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"similar" simple ones, the classification precludes integration of eco-
nomically offsetting positions that should and would be integrated
without any special integration rules under a bifurcation regime. For
example, a cubbyhole system that treats a PPF as an ordinary forward
enables the purchaser under the PPF to enter into an economically
offsetting transaction that generates deductible interest expense. Be-
cause the PPF is put in the ordinary forward cubbyhole, the interest
income the purchaser realizes under the PPF goes untaxed.
As contrasted with the current set of tax cubbyholes, the spanning
set under the carved-out interest regime does not accord different tax
treatment to any particular constituent type of return depending on
the instrument in which the return is embedded; the basic returns are
"instrument-invariant." In essence, the proposed bifurcation regime
specifies that positions may comprise one or more of three elements-
straight debt, traditional equity, and "expected equity (or expense)"
in the case of a right to receive or an obligation to deliver property in
the future. All financial instruments are in principle reducible to
some combination of these elements. As a result, the number of dis-
tinct synthetics that a taxpayer may construct is relatively small, and
the opportunities for offsetting treatment through combinations of
similar but distinct assets are reduced; in particular, it becomes diffi-
cult to create an arbitrage that relies on the presence in an instrument
of a debt or equity component that is not taxed as such.225 The small
number of elements in the spanning set also may make it compara-
tively easy for the government to identify abusive transactions and to
articulate rules for integration that do not impair beneficial transac-
tions or create substantial deadweight loss. Finally, and most impor-
tantly, the fact that none of these elements consists of other elements
in the set substantially reduces opportunities for exploiting inconsis-
tency through synthetics. For example, interest under the carve-out
approach always is taxed as such, whether it is expressly stated in a
standard debt instrument or implicit as part of an option.
In order to illustrate these points, consider the example of a "stock
index growth note," or SIGN, discussed at some length by Alvin
Warren: 226
Example 13: On Day 1, Holder purchases from Issuer, X
Corp., a five-year SIGN for $1,000. The SIGN pays $1,000 at
maturity plus $1,000 times the percentage increase, if any, in
225 See Weisbach, Tax Responses, note 6, at 520 (noting that more uniform rules would
reduce the problem of multiple bifurcations).
226 See Warren, note 1, at 483.
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the S&P 500 at the end of five years. Assume that on Day 1
the AFR is 10% compounded annually.
Warren identifies three different possible bifurcations of the SIGN in
Example 13, each enjoying different tax treatment under current law,
in support of his claim that disaggregation and integration by them-
selves cannot solve the problems that new financial instruments cre-
ate.22 7 Although this claim undoubtedly is correct, the concern
appears to be somewhat overstated. Disaggregation and integration
may be able to solve a wide array of problems where the spanning set
is small and internally consistent. For example, under the approach
advocated here, each of the bifurcations he identifies has the same tax
result.
The first bifurcation Warren discusses is the one that would have
applied under the 1991 proposed CDI regulations. 22 8 These regula-
tions would treat the SIGN as equivalent to an investment unit con-
sisting of a debt instrument issued for $621 and paying $1,000 at
maturity, and a cash-settled option on the percentage increase, if any,
of $1,000 of the S&P 500 during the contract term issued for $379.229
Under the OID rules $379 of interest would accrue on the debt instru-
ment during the term, while taxation of the option would await exer-
cise, cancellation, lapse, or disposition.
Warren next describes two alternative characterizations of the
SIGN that have tax consequences under existing law that are inconsis-
tent with those under the first bifurcation.2 30 First, the SIGN could be
likened to a loan of $1,000 at 10%, together with a forward contract
obligating Holder to exchange the interest that accumulates on the
loan for the excess, if any, of the S&P 500 over $1,000 at the end of
five years.2 31 According to this characterization, $621 of interest
would accrue on the $1,000 loan and the forward contract would gen-
erate no tax consequences until the end of the term. Under then-is-
sued proposed regulations (since withdrawn) Issuer would deduct the
interest on the entire issue price,232 much as it can under the current
noncontingent bond method applicable to CDIs.
233
227 Id. at 486.
228 See note 186.
229 See Prop. Reg. § 1.1275-4(g), 56 Fed. Reg. 8,308, 8,310 (Feb. 28, 1991).
230 The most notable difference between the rules in effect in 1993, when Warren's arti-
cle appeared, and the current rules is the rejection of the bifurcation method for CDIs in
favor of the noncontingent bond method. See text accompanying notes 184-88.
231 Warren, note 1, at 484; see text accompanying note 238.
232 See I.R.S. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Relating to Tax Treatment of Contingent
Payment Debt Instruments, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Jan. 21, 1993; Reg. § 1.1275-4(b).
233 Reg. § 1.1275-4(b)(3).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
2004]
HeinOnlin   -- 57 Tax L. Rev. 473 2003-2004
TAX LAW REVIEW
Warren's second alternative characterization results from applica-
tion of the put-call parity theorem.234 Since the SIGN already has
been analyzed as an OID debt instrument together with a call option,
under put-call parity Holder could be treated as purchasing $1,000 of
S&P 500 index units and five-year puts at $1,000. Under this charac-
terization, Holder has no tax consequences until the end of the five-
year term.
The first conclusion to draw from these recharacterizations is that
an effective bifurcation regime must provide clear rules for how the
bifurcation is to take place. As Weisbach points out, bifurcation is not
self-executing.2 35 This requirement is not, however, fatal to the bifur-
cation approach. The object of bifurcation is to preserve consistency
and continuity given the basic fact that the tax law treats different
kinds of returns differently. If a complex instrument economically is
equivalent to two or more combinations of other instruments that en-
joy different tax treatments, it becomes necessary to identify which of
these combinations applies in order to determine the tax conse-
quences of the complex instrument. The fact that the taxpayer also
may be able to acquire separately the components of one of the other
combinations presents a distinct problem of integration: When should
such a combination of formally distinct instruments be respected, and
when should it be collapsed and treated as a unit? This problem, how-
ever, arises whenever different economic returns enjoy different tax
treatments.
The second conclusion is that a bifurcation regime is apt to be less
successful when the members of the spanning set are themselves in-
consistently taxed. This circumstance arises when, economically, one
or more such members represent a composite of returns that are sub-
ject to different tax rules when they are not combined in the spanning
set member. In effect, by treating the composite of returns as a funda-
mental unit for tax purposes, such a bifurcation regime works against
consistency and continuity by sanctioning mistaxation through inte-
gration in the member itself. Warren's last alternative characteriza-
tion of the SIGN illustrates this point. The put-call parity theorem
establishes an equivalence involving four elements, each of which is
treated as a fundamental unit under current law: a put option, a call
option, a zero coupon bond, and an underlying asset. Economically,
the first three of these contain interest components, but only the rules
for the zero coupon bond tax this interest.2 36 Because the tax law ef-
234 Warren, note 1, at 485-86.
235 See Weisbach, Tax Responses, note 6, at 513.
236 In point of fact, the distinction between equity and debt is somewhat formal. Some
debt may have equity features, and vice-versa, so that determining the tax treatment of a
particular return based on whether it is denominated "debt" or "equity" may be somewhat
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fectively treats an option as a member of the spanning set but also
seeks to tax interest as it accrues, the elements of the spanning set
themselves create opportunities for tax avoidance through synthetics.
A final conclusion to draw from Warren's discussion is that a span-
ning set that does not tax its elements inconsistently at least would
prevent the bifurcation regime from working against itself in this way.
Though opportunities for arbitrage through synthetics will persist, a
consistent bifurcation regime will not sanction them by respecting fun-
damental units that themselves contain inconsistent characterizations.
The approach developed in this Article avoids this difficulty because it
consistently separates interest-like accruals from other kinds of re-
turns. To see this point, consider again Warren's three characteriza-
tions of the SIGN under the carve-out system proposed here. I
assume for this purpose that the carve-out rules would apply whether
or not ownership of the SIGN involves the assumption or disposition
of an investment risk.2 37 Under each of Warren's characterizations,
the tax consequences would be identical.
The first characterization treated the SIGN as a zero coupon bond
issued at $621 together with a cash-settled option contract on the S&P
500 index. So viewed, the SIGN would generate $379 of OID interest
income less interest deductions from deemed borrowing on the op-
tion, together with the remaining consequences of call option owner-
ship described in Section III.B. This characterization conforms to the
basic carve-out analysis, separating debt from the property transfer
and treating the latter under the carve-out rules.
Warren's second characterization treated the SIGN as a $1,000 loan
together with a cash-settled forward contract for the purchase of the
excess, if any, of the S&P 500 over $1,000 in five years.2 38 Note first
that this characterization is not quite accurate. The separate instru-
ment is in effect an option contract that is post-paid, not an ordinary
forward contract, because the implicit strike price is greater than zero.
In other words, the contract does not involve the purchase forward of
arbitrary. See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker & James S. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Cor-
porations and Shareholders 4.02[1] (7th ed. 2000) ("'[D]ebt' and 'equity' are labels for
the two edges of a spectrum, between which lie an infinite number of investment instru-
ments .... "). Therefore the suggestion that equity does not have an interest component is
not entirely accurate. Further, in some cases even simple common stock may represent a
hybrid between real equity-like risk and a debt-like return, depending on the investment
and other policies of the issuer. These considerations underscore the partial nature of the
solutions offered in this Article.
237 If purchase of the SIGN did not involve such an assumption or a disposition, Con-
gress might well adopt these rules nevertheless, given the opportunities for arbitrage that a
mark-to-market or other regime for non-investment-risk bearing SIGNs might create. See
Section IV.B.
238 Warren, note 1, at 484.
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all the value (whatever it may be) of $1,000 of the S&P 500 index, as
measured on Day 1, in five years, but only of the excess, if any, of that
index over $1,000 in five years. A forward purchase of such a benefit
is an option contract.
The following observations illustrate this point. First, note that an
ordinary option is akin to a regular PPF in that payment for the option
right typically occurs before the exercise date. This feature of an op-
tion is not, however, necessary to achieve the basic economics of the
option, which involves the exchange of a fixed payment for either the
opportunity to enjoy contingent upside or protection against contin-
gent downside in the underlying property. Consider the following
example:
Example 14: On Day 1, 100 units of the S&P 500 index have
a fair market value of $1,000, and an option to purchase this
quantity of the S&P 500 index for $1,000 on Day 2, five years
later, costs $379 (the S&P 500 Option). On Day 1, A and B
agree that on Day 2, A will pay B $611; in exchange, B will
permit A to purchase 100 units of the S&P 500 index on
Day 2 for $1,000 (the Forward Option). The risk-free rate of
interest on Day 1 is 10%.
The only difference between the Forward Option and the S&P 500
Option is that A pays later, and therefore more, under the Forward
Option, because the Forward Option price includes the time value of
deferral on the option premium. The fundamental optionality is pre-
sent in both instruments. In exchange for a fixed payment, A obtains
the benefits of owning 100 units of the S&P 500 index if it appreciates
to more than $1,000, but does not bear the burden of any decline be-
low that amount. For this reason, A could replicate the Forward Op-
tion through the same dynamic hedging that applies to any standard
option. The Forward Option in Example 14 is not, however, a stan-
dard forward contract, because it does not transfer the benefits and
burdens of ownership of 100 units of the S&P 500 index. 239
239 These observations show why a PPF can be conceptualized as the limit case of an
option with a strike price of zero. See David F. Levy, Disparities in Treatment Among
Prepaid Forward Contracts, Deep in the Money Options, Prepaid Swaps, and Contingent
Debt Instruments, in Tax Strategies for Corporate Acquisitions, Dispositions, Spin-Offs,
Joint Ventures, Financings, Reorganizations & Restructurings, available in WESTLAW,
432 PLI/Tax 729, 745 n.24 (1998) ("Indeed, as the option premium increases and the strike
price of the option decreases, the economic differences between a deep in the money
purchase option and a standard prepaid forward contract begin to disappear."). At this
point, however, all of the optionality has disappeared, because the purchaser has not lim-
ited her downside as compared to ownership of the underlying asset. In effect, she has
purchased the asset. See David F. Levy, Using Financial Derivatives as Real Estate Invest-
ment Vehicles, 25 J. Real Estate Tax'n 231, 244 (1998) ("[T]he key difference between a
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Therefore, if the SIGN in Example 13 is bifurcated into a $1,000
loan and some other financial instrument, the financial instrument is
the cash-settled version of the Forward Option described in Example
14, not an ordinary cash-settled forward contract. In this variation,
Holder would receive $611 of interest income during the term on the
$1,000 loan, while, under the forward option contract, she is obligated
to pay $611 at the end of five years in exchange for the appreciation
(if any) between Days 1 and 2 in $1,000 of the S&P 500 index as mea-
sured on Day 1. On Day 1 this right is worth $379, the same as an
actual cash-settled option on the appreciation in the S&P 500 index if
it had been purchased on Day 1, but it is offset by the obligation to
deliver $611 at the end of the five-year term. The question is how to
treat this right and offsetting obligation.
If the forward option contract were a simple forward contract of the
kind described in Section IV.A, realization principles would treat the
rights the contract represents as appreciating on a constant yield-to-
maturity basis to $611, irrespective of the actual value of the underly-
ing asset, just as in the case of the normal forward purchase of an
asset. In that case, the right under the forward obligation would be
deemed to appreciate on the same schedule as the obligation to de-
liver $611 after five years, so that Holder would have no tax conse-
quences on the forward option purchase.
Holding an option, however, is not the same as holding some or all
of the underlying asset; it is akin to continuous realizations. For this
reason, it is not appropriate to treat the forward option as though it
appreciates at the same rate as the obligation to pay for it does. In-
stead, the obligation to deliver $611 is a separate obligation incurred
by Holder on Day 1, received in exchange for the forward option. The
net appreciation in the obligation is $242. When applied against the
$611 interest income on the $1,000 loan, the net result is $379 of inter-
est income plus an option taxed under the dynamic hedging principles
previously described. This result is the same as viewing the instru-
ment as consisting of an OID debt instrument issued at $621 and pay-
ing $1,000 at maturity in five years and a cash-settled option contract
on the appreciation in the S&P 500 index costing $379.
Warren's final characterization of the SIGN relies on the equiva-
lence under the put-call parity theorem between ownership of a zero
coupon bond and a call, and ownership of the underlying asset and a
put. Here the asset is the number of units of the S&P 500 index that
$1,000 buys on Day 1. These two sets of instruments would be taxed
call option holder and the holder of a long forward contract is that the option holder's
downside is limited to the option premium, whereas the holder of a long forward contract's
downside is equal to the forward price of the forward contract.").
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the same under the carved-out interest rules. The zero coupon bond
generates interest inclusions while the call would generate interest de-
ductions; the deductions will be less than the inclusions because the
deemed borrowing would finance purchase of less than the full under-
lying asset. The net difference would be equal to the amount of inter-
est on the deemed lending that the put option generates, while
ownership of the asset itself would produce no tax consequences.
Note that the same identity of tax consequences would result under
the carve-out rules for the synthetic stock sale in Example 12. In that
transaction the holder of the asset sold a call, purchased a put, and
issued a zero coupon bond. Whether disaggregated into these compo-
nent parts or treated as an asset sale, the consequences would be the
same. The deemed interest accruals on the two options generally
would offset the interest deductions on the zero coupon bond, even
under a quasi-mark-to-market regime that approximated the deemed
sales and purchases under Black-Scholes, while the receipt of the call
option premium and purchase of the put would trigger built-in gain or
loss.
The identity of outcomes under these different bifurcations sup-
ports the more general claim that a small, internally consistent and
rigorously applied spanning set not only resolves the basic problem of
discontinuity that hybrids exploit, but goes some way to overcoming
the inconsistency that is inherent in the cubbyhole approach. It also
should be said, however, that the carve-out rules, like any bifurcation
regime that preserves a multiple-element spanning set, do not elimi-
nate problems of inconsistency. For example, one stock may serve as
a hedge against another; a taxpayer who purchases both kinds of stock
creates an investment that is similar to debt. Similarly, stocks that are
substitutes or near substitutes for each other can form a synthetic debt
instrument if the holder sells one short and purchases the other for-
ward. 240 If the stocks are perfect hedges with respect to returns in
excess of the riskless rate, then the instrument is identical to debt. In
a spanning set that includes different rules for debt and equity, the
effect of such offsetting equity positions will not be addressed absent
specific rules that deal with them. More generally, under such a span-
ning set any diversified portfolio will limit the holder's upside poten-
tial and downside risk, so that the overall return moves in the
direction of debt. For a variety of reasons, the reduction of risk in a
standard portfolio through diversification has never been treated as
240 See, e.g., Aaron Lucchetti & Henny Sender, Big Freddie Mac Holders Hang On,
Wall St. J., June 13, 2003, at C1 ("[S]everal hedge funds ... hold Freddie Mac shares
offsetting some of the riskier bearish positions in their portfolios. One favorite ploy: sell-
ing borrowed shares of Fannie Mae . . . against a 'long,' or buying, position in Freddie
Mac.").
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cause for taxing returns from it as other than on capital assets.241 Ac-
cordingly, any set of rules dealing with synthetics needs to be able to
draw a line between diversification that will not be integrated and off-
setting positions that will be. A bifurcation regime, by itself, does not
provide a basis on which to do this.
VI. CONCLUSION
Financial contract innovation undermines the federal income tax
system in two basic ways, both of which are related to the inconsistent
and incomplete application of realization principles in the income tax.
First, it disaggregates the kinds of economic returns that a real eco-
nomic investment generates from ownership of the investment itself.
Because historical practice generally supported realization-based tax-
ation for risk-based returns that derived from assumption of an invest-
ment risk, but not for other kinds of risk-based returns, the principal
tax effect of this disaggregation has been to extend the realization rule
to many contexts in which there is neither precedent nor a sound pol-
icy basis for doing so. Second, financial contract innovation presents
an opportunity for the seemingly limitless combination of different
kinds of assets and returns into new assets with new returns. In eco-
nomic terms these new assets may mimic other familiar assets, or they
may have economic characteristics that share those of two (or more)
other assets without being reducible to either. In the first case the tax
law must be able to identify and tax the combination as the familiar
asset; in the second case it must be able to tax the asset in a way that
both approaches accuracy as compared to similar instruments and
avoids arbitrage opportunities. In the absence of rules that address
these distinct effects of synthesis and hybridization, the capacity that
financial contract innovation affords to carve up and reallocate re-
turns on underlying assets creates opportunities for tax avoidance by
exploiting inconsistency and discontinuity.
I have argued for a two-pronged approach to deal with these
problems. The first prong would confine application of the realization
rule to the investment-risk return of an asset, and the second would
apply realization and accrual principles consistently to all financial re-
turns, whether freestanding or combined as part of a complex finan-
cial instrument. The virtues of this approach are several and
significant. First, it resolves the basic problems of discontinuity that
lie at the heart of the second set of issues described above. As argued
241 These reasons include the disincentive to diversify as well as practical problems of
implementing integration rules when the extent of risk reduction can assume any point on
a continuum. See Weisbach, Tax Responses, note 6, at 507.
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here and by others, bifurcation properly implemented represents the
best general approach to the problems of hybrids because it preserves
the basic tax treatments that are designed to apply to different kinds
of returns, regardless of whether they are received separately or in
combination with other returns in the same instrument.
Second, because the approach is consistently applied to all financial
instruments, it removes inconsistencies between taxation of the hybrid
and of its components. The possibility of inconsistent taxation is fur-
ther reduced because the spanning set is small and reflects the basic
distinctions the tax law has long drawn between investment-based risk
and other kinds of risk. The small size of the spanning set under the
carve-out rules also makes the more general problem of inconsistency
through synthesis more manageable, because of the smaller number of
possible combinations of fundamental instruments that a taxpayer can
use to offset each other and because of the absence of inconsistency
among various elements of the spanning set.
Finally, the approach preserves the basic rules that have always ap-
plied to straight debt and equity under the income tax. Adoption of a
tax regime that addresses financial contract innovation within the es-
tablished framework for these plain vanilla assets would impose sub-
stantially lower transition costs than would adoption of more
sweeping reform, and it also would do comparatively little to upset
settled expectations for the vast majority of taxpayers. For these rea-
sons it therefore is likely to represent a more politically viable solution
to the problems of financial contract innovation than do the more
comprehensive proposals that others have offered.
Having said all of this, it is important to emphasize again the partial
nature of this solution. Any approach to the taxation of financial con-
tract innovation that operates within the framework of the realization
rule will preserve some opportunities to exploit the rule, because
some assets or arrangements are bound to fall close to either side of
the line dividing realization and accrual accounting. This proposal is
no exception: Opportunities for arbitrage will remain, though they
will be greatly reduced. Further, because the distinction between debt
and equity is itself somewhat formal, even a relentlessly applied bifur-
cation regime predicated on the debt-equity distinction will not tax
differing economic returns differently in all respects, nor will always it
tax similar returns similarly. For nominal stock that has debt-like fea-
tures, deferral for an interest-like return will be available; for risky
debt, current accrual (and deduction) will remain. But these problems
already afflict the tax system, so their persistence is to some extent
orthogonal to the solution proposed here.
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What these and other problems illuminate is the extraordinarily dif-
ficult nature of crafting a workable tax system that can deal with the
complexities of modern finance. Any solution that operates within
real-world constraints will have many of the messy features of the cur-
rent system, and these may appear particularly unlovely in compari-
son with proposals for comprehensive reform and simplification that
purport to resolve fundamental and far-reaching problems with the
income tax. On the other hand, there is legitimate reason to suspect
that any proposal for comprehensive reform will bring complexities
and compromises of its own that cannot be foreseen before the propo-
sal is actually adopted. While these considerations do not imply that
comprehensive reform should not be pursued, they suggest that any
compromise proposal that may represent a significant improvement to
the current system should be worthy of consideration. This proposal,
like others that have preceded it, is offered in that spirit.
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